Following the most recent blog (In re Jones, blog dated March 21, 2016) about the Supreme Court’s continued interest in the Hatcher rule,the
Michigan Court of Appeals has vacated an order terminating a father’s parental
rights because the trial court effectively deprived him of an adjudication trial
and, as a result, his due process rights were violated.
The published ruling in In re Collier (DocketNo. 328172) makes two things clear:
- before the state can infringe on the constitutionally protected parent-child relationship, due process requires an adjudication trial on the parent’s fitness, and
- challenging a termination of rights order is not an impermissible “collateral attack” on the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction when the parent has effectively been denied an adjudication hearing.
In Collier,
the respondent-father never appeared at the scheduled adjudication trial in St.
Clair County Circuit Court. At the adjudication proceeding, the respondent’s attorney
was excused, at her request, from further representing him and she exited the
proceedings. The trial court then entered a default against the respondent for failing
to appear. The hearing continued without the respondent and his attorney, and
the petitioner presented unopposed evidence.
Afterward, the respondent attended subsequent
dispositional hearings without having an attorney. He remained without legal
representation for about one year.
A
petition was ultimately filed to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. At
the termination hearing (where the respondent had legal representation), the
trial court held the respondent’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant
to MCL 712A.19b, and an order was entered to that effect.
The respondent appealed the termination
order, claiming his due process rights were violated.
Adjudication
Effectively Denied
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals cited
the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in In
re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 (2014), which struck down the one-parent doctrine as
unconstitutional.
Turning
to Collier, the Court of Appeals said
the respondent was “effectively denied the adjudication trial to which he was
entitled.”
In reaching this conclusion, the Court of
Appeals said the Michigan Court Rules do not indicate that a default can be
entered in child-protective proceedings and that due process requires an
adjudication trial on a parent’s fitness before the state can infringe on the
constitutionally protected parent-child relationship.
According to the appeals court, a default is
not an adjudication trial as to the fitness of a parent, and it cannot serve as
a substitute for a trial.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the
petitioner’s argument that the respondent did, indeed, receive an adjudication
trial. “Plowing forward with an adjudication trial in the absence of both
respondent and an attorney who can represent respondent offends due process by any
stretch of the imagination,” the appeals court said.
The Court of Appeals further pointed out that,
because counsel had initially been appointed, the respondent was entitled to “assume”
that counsel was representing him at the adjudication trial. “[W]e find a
violation of due process given that petitioner was permitted to proceed
unopposed at adjudication, thereby effectively depriving respondent of an
adjudication trial,” the appeals court said.
In addition, the respondent was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel throughout the proceedings, the Court of Appeals
explained. “We are … troubled by the fact that it appears … that respondent did
not have counsel for nearly the entirety of the dispositional phase of the
proceedings,” the appeals court noted.
“Given all that occurred in this case, we
simply cannot conclude that respondent was afforded a ‘specific adjudication’
regarding his fitness or lack thereof,” the Court of Appeals said, finding the respondent
was denied due process.
No Impermissible
Collateral Attack
Turning to the petitioner’s argument that
the respondent’s challenge was an impermissible collateral attack on the trial court’s
exercise of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals noted the respondent waited
until after the termination order was entered to file his appeal.
If In
re SLH, 277 Mich App 662 (2008), and In
re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426 (1993), were followed, the appeals court said the challenge
would be an impermissible collateral attack because the appeal was not filed
until after the respondent’s parental rights were terminated.
However, “we decline to find that the
collateral-attack rule bars respondent’s challenge,” the Court of Appeals declared.
In reaching this conclusion, the appeals court relied on In re Kanjia, 308 Mich App 660 (2014), saying Collier presented the same situation as Kanjia — the respondent effectively never received an adjudication
as to his fitness as a parent.
“Consequently, just as in Kanjia, … we conclude that respondent ‘is
not collaterally attacking the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, but
rather is directly challenging the trial court’s decision to terminate the
respondent’s parental rights without first having afforded the respondent
sufficient due process, i.e., an adjudication hearing at which the respondent's
fitness as a parent was decided,’” the Court of Appeals said.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated
the order terminating the respondent’s parental rights and the order of
adjudication, and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
Labels: adjudication trial, appeal, appeals, child-protective proceedings, Family, family law appeal, In re Hatcher, In re Sanders, In re SLH, Law, Michgian, Michigan Family Law Appeal, termination of parental rights
