tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-45989458268743849302024-03-13T18:20:15.403-04:00Michigan AppealsA blog to explore and discuss issues affecting appellate practice, including recent cases, primarily from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appellate decisions examined in this blog cover a wide range of fields, such as family, criminal, employment, and personal injury law.Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.comBlogger274125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-15023515481750135002018-04-27T11:30:00.000-04:002018-04-27T12:02:49.801-04:00Recent Appellate Rulings Create Concern For Michigan Adoptions <span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Two
recent Michigan Court of Appeals decisions, if not reversed, may end up hindering
direct placement adoptions in Michigan. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">The
rulings in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re MGR, Minor</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re LMB, Minor</i> are concerning for
prospective adoptive parents because they allow putative fathers to stop an
adoption in its tracks, simply by obtaining an order of filiation from the trial
court. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3_EKtApSqc4/WuNA0C-7w2I/AAAAAAAAAwM/cWD5TS2YNTktDBIjTIIx-3hvIFxcS8x6gCLcBGAs/s1600/Putative%2BFather.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="800" height="320" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-3_EKtApSqc4/WuNA0C-7w2I/AAAAAAAAAwM/cWD5TS2YNTktDBIjTIIx-3hvIFxcS8x6gCLcBGAs/s320/Putative%2BFather.png" width="320" /></span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In
both cases, the Court of Appeals indicated that it does not matter how far
along in the adoption process the putative father gets the order of filiation, nor
does it matter whether he provided no support to the child or the mother.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In
re MGR<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In
re MGR</span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"> (Docket Nos. 338286 and 340203, issued 2/27/18) is a published
and binding decision. The matter involved concurrent adoption and paternity
proceedings. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">The putative
father in the case appeared by telephone at the March 2017 adoption hearing,
conducted pursuant to §39 of the Adoption Code (MCL 710.39). The trial court later
entered an order indicating it would take no further action in the adoption
case until the paternity action was resolved. That order was appealed, and the
Court of Appeals granted a motion for immediate consideration. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In a May 2017
unpublished order, the Court of Appeals instructed the trial court to continue
the adoption proceedings. Accordingly, the trial court recommenced the §39 adoption
hearing and issued an opinion, finding that although the putative father did
not appear in person at the March 2017 hearing, he properly appeared by
telephone and expressed his intent to pursue custody if a paternity test showed
him to be the child’s father. The trial court also determined the putative
father was a “do something” father and declined to terminate his parental
rights.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">On appeal, the
appellants argued the trial court should have terminated the putative father’s parental
rights because he did not personally appear and contest custody during the §39
hearing. The Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the trial court’s finding
that the putative father properly appeared at the adoption hearing. The Court
also dismissed as moot the claim that the adoption proceedings were improperly
adjourned.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">The appellants further
argued the trial court erroneously held that the putative father provided
“substantial and regular support or care” to the mother during her pregnancy,
so that his parental rights could not be terminated. Ruling this issue was moot,
the Court of Appeals said: “After the trial court entered its opinion and order
declining to terminate appellee’s parental rights under MCL 710.39(2), the same
court entered an order of filiation in the separate paternity action, declaring
appellee to be MGR’s biological and, therefore, legal father. Accordingly,
appellee is no longer a putative father, and neither we nor the trial court can
grant relief under MCL 710.39(1) and (2), which both exclusively address
termination of a </span><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">putative</span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"> </span><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">father’s </span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">rights
during the course of an adoption. As appellee is now considered a legal parent,
his rights can only be terminated pursuant to MCL 712A.19b.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">The Court of
Appeals continued by finding an order of filiation can control the disposition
of the adoption appeal, thus refuting the argument that proceedings under the
Adoption Code take precedence over actions under the Paternity Act. “[T]hat
argument is contradicted by this Court’s decision in </span><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In re MKK</span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">
[286 Mich App 546 (2009)],” the Court said. “Additionally, although the Legislature
has indicated that adoption proceedings should generally have the highest
priority on court dockets ‘so as to provide for their earliest </span><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">practicable </span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">disposition,’
… no statutory provision has been pointed out to us </span><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">mandating </span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">that
adoption proceedings must </span><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">always
</span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">be
completed before a determination in a parallel paternity proceeding. MCL
710.25(2) in fact creates an exception to the general rule, allowing for the
adjournment of adoption proceedings upon a showing of good cause.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">The </span><i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In re MKK </span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">panel
had ruled that good cause to adjourn an adoption hearing “can be established by
the existence of a timely paternity action,” the Court of Appeals said, noting
that <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re MKK</i> is a binding decision
that has not been rejected by the courts.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In conclusion, the
Court of Appeals discounted the concern that trial courts will “purposefully
insulate” their adoption rulings by subsequently entering an order of filiation
that would moot the appeal of the earlier adoption ruling. “Rather, we employ
the well-earned presumption that trial courts act properly in accord with their
constitutional duties,” the Court stated. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: center; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In re LMB</span></b><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In
re LMB</span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"> (Docket No. 338169, issued 3/13/18) is an unpublished
decision that, like <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re MGR</i>, involved
concurrent adoption and paternity proceedings. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">The<span style="background: white; color: black;"> putative father in the case did not
support the child or the mother, and did not have a custodial relationship with
the child. At the §39 adoption hearing, the trial court refused to terminate
the putative father’s rights to the child. The decision was appealed.</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">After the §39 adoption hearing began, the
putative father filed a paternity action. While the adoption appeal was
pending, the trial judge in the paternity case entered an order of filiation under
which the putative father was held to be the child’s legal father. The
prospective adoptive parents filed a motion to stay the paternity case and
prevent entry of the order of filiation, but the motion was denied.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">The </span><a href="http://michiganappeals.blogspot.com/2017/11/court-of-appeals-hold-that-adoption-is.html"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Court
of Appeals first decided <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re LMB</i></span></a><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">
in September 2017, finding that the adoption issue was moot because an order of
filiation had been entered by the trial court. The case was subsequently appealed
to the Michigan Supreme Court, which vacated the Court of Appeals decision and
remanded for reconsideration in light of the Court of Appeals order in </span><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/coa/public/orders/2017/341211(29)_order.pdf"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Sarna v Healy</span></i></a><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">
(Docket No. 341211, issued 12/18/17). <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: black; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">On remand, the </span><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov:81/OPINIONS/FINAL/COA/20180313_C338169_78_338169O.OPN.PDF"><span style="background: white; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Court of Appeals again dismissed the appeal</span></a><span style="background: white; color: black; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"> as moot because the order of filiation was not vacated
and the respondent’s status as the child’s legal father had not changed. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: black; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals
noted it was bound to follow its decision in </span><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">In
re MGR</span></i><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">. “In that case, the trial court entered an order
refusing to terminate the then-putative father’s parental rights to MGR
pursuant to MCL 710.39, and then, while the petitioners’ appeal of that
decision was pending, the trial court entered an order of filiation determining
the putative father to be the child’s legal father,” the Court wrote.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">“The
pertinent facts of this case are the same as in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re MGR</i> and, as a published decision, <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re MGR</i> is binding precedent,” the Court of Appeals said. “Accordingly,
because respondent father is LMB’s legal father, it is impossible for this
Court to grant petitioners’ requested relief and remand for a determination of
whether respondent legal father’s rights should be terminated under a section
only applicable to putative father.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Concerns For Prospective Adoptive Parents<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="border: none 1.0pt; color: black; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%; padding: 0in;">The decisions in <i>In re MGR </i>and<i>
In re LMB</i></span><span style="color: black; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"> focus
on the interplay between the </span><a href="http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(l5s0dperuz51dgvwdylkie1o))/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl-Act-205-of-1956"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Paternity Act</span></a><span style="color: black; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"> and the </span><a href="http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(nxznti3pnpq5fxwwno3aapjy))/mileg.aspx?page=GetObject&objectname=mcl-710-21"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Adoption Code</span></a><span style="color: black; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">. Both rulings create
concerns when it comes to adoptions, particularly because there is no policy
that paternity proceedings be stayed while an adoption case is pending.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="color: black; font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">It is especially troublesome that, based on the decisions
in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re MGR</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re LMB</i>, a putative father can moot an adoption appeal simply by
obtaining a DNA test and an order of filiation. Pursuant to the rulings in both
cases, appellate review of an adoption decision favoring the putative father is
basically eliminated. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: black; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">At the </span><a href="http://www.speakerlaw.com/"><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Speaker Law Firm</span></a><span style="color: black; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">, we believe the ability
to prevent appellate review through a concurrent paternity proceeding will result
in the inconsistent application of the law. Unfortunately, it will also lead to
unpredictability for prospective adoptive parents in cases where a putative
father comes forth.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Both
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re MGR</i> and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">In re LMB</i> are being appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-24503113773100109112018-04-20T11:47:00.002-04:002018-04-20T11:55:36.693-04:00Michigan Court Of Appeals: Coercing Child Into Gender Role Is ‘Abuse’<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">A
trial court properly took jurisdiction over a mother’s three children after she
allegedly coerced one of them into a gender role with which the child did not
identify, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled, finding that the mother’s
actions constituted “abuse.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">“[W]e
conclude that forcing a child to act as a gender the child does not identify
with – whatever gender that is, and whatever gender the parent is attempting to
coerce – is certainly the kind of mistreatment by a parent that could cause
deep and lasting harm to a child,” the Court of Appeals wrote in </span><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20180315_c337790_65_337790.opn.pdf"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">In re Churchill/Belinski, Minors</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 200%;"> (Docket
No. 337790, unpublished per curiam opinion, issued 3/15/18).</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-623AMD0SYhg/WtoLdAMDC3I/AAAAAAAAAvs/r_24mppdsvkGEGHpESxrqM2yFjCUW1nrgCLcBGAs/s1600/gender%2Broles.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="795" height="320" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-623AMD0SYhg/WtoLdAMDC3I/AAAAAAAAAvs/r_24mppdsvkGEGHpESxrqM2yFjCUW1nrgCLcBGAs/s320/gender%2Broles.jpg" width="282" /></span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Clare County Circuit Court’s order taking
jurisdiction over the children and transferring custody of the children to their
respective fathers. The Court also affirmed the trial court’s order granting
the mother parenting time and directing her to <span style="background: white; color: black;">participate in psychological therapy “with a provider of her
choice.” </span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: black; line-height: 200%;">However, in its opinion, the Court of Appeals expressed
some concern about the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services’ (DHHS)
reasons for pursuing the petition in the first place. “</span><span style="line-height: 200%;">While
we have some reservations about [DHHS’s] motives, we reluctantly are required
to affirm,” the Court stated</span></span><span style="font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">.<span style="background: white; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background: white; font-family: inherit;">Trial
Court Takes Jurisdiction</span></b><br />
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="background: white; font-family: inherit; font-size: large;"><br /></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The case primarily involved one of the mother’s children
being allegedly coerced into a gender role that the child “had previously
expressed some interest in but ultimately did not want.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">After the trial court took jurisdiction over the
children, the mother appealed. She argued that even if the assertions in the
DHHS petition were true, it was insufficient to take jurisdiction over her
children. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: black; line-height: 200%;">The mother also asserted that, if the trial court’s
decision was affirmed, </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">it would set a dangerous precedent for
parents who are trying to care for their gender nonconforming children based on
the most recent professional standards because it would categorize the best
practices as abuse. <span style="background: white; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Meanwhile, DHHS maintained that the evidence in
the case was “overwhelming.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<h2>
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><div style="text-align: center;">
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt;">
<b><span style="background: white; font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14pt;">‘No Other Option’<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
</div>
</span></b></h2>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In its opinion, the Court of Appeals disagreed
with the mother – and also disagreed with DHHS in several respects. </span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; color: black; line-height: 200%;">“The evidence was nothing even remotely of the
sort,” the Court of Appeals said, referring to DHHS’s claim of “overwhelming”
evidence. According to the Court, it was affirming the trial court’s decision “<em><span style="border: none windowtext 1.0pt; mso-border-alt: none windowtext 0in; padding: 0in;">only </span></em>because the applicable standards of review
or mandatory inferences </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">we are required to draw in petitioner’s
favor leave us with no other option.”<span style="background: white; color: black;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Notably,
the </span><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/coa/public/orders/2017/337790(50)_order.pdf"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Youth
Law Center filed an amicus brief</span></a><span style="line-height: 200%;"> in the matter, arguing it
was a case of a child “being taken away from a loving and concerned parent
strictly for being transgendered.” <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">But
according to the Court of Appeals, the allegations were “exactly the opposite”
– the child was <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> transgender and the
mother “was harming the child by forcing a gender identity onto the child
rather than permitting one.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The
Court of Appeals further emphasized that its decision was based on a finding
that the law “absolutely cannot countenance, and absolutely deems abusive,
forcing a particular gender on a child against the child’s wishes, no matter in
which way the gender is forced. In other words, it would constitute abuse to
force a child who is transgender to conform to any particular gender identity,
as well.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">According
to the Court of Appeals, forcing a child to act as a gender the child does not
identify with is the kind of mistreatment that could cause long-term harm to a
child. In this case, the Court pointed out the child was reportedly not
transgender and the mother was allegedly coercing him into a female role
against his wishes. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">“Such
treatment constitutes abuse, and it is therefore a sufficient basis for taking
jurisdiction,” the Court of Appeals wrote. “Our conclusion would be identical
if [the child] was transgender and respondent was coercing him into a male role
against his wishes.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="background: white; color: black; font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Based on the seriousness of the allegations, the
Court of Appeals said the trial court correctly declined to dismiss the DHHS petition
and properly denied the mother’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court further
held that the jury verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">“Ultimately,
despite our concerns, the law precludes this Court from acting as a thirteenth
juror, and because it favors resolution of issues on their merits, it
constrains us to conclude that the matter was properly submitted to the jury
and properly disposed of by the trial court thereafter,” the Court of Appeals
concluded.</span></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Clare County, MI, USA44.0565054 -84.8567931999999743.6909284 -85.502240199999974 44.4220824 -84.211346199999966tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-78462893081750590202018-04-16T15:10:00.002-04:002018-04-16T15:23:20.105-04:00Federal Appeals Court: Employer Unreasonably Denied Pregnant Worker’s Telecommuting Request<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<br />
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> An
employer should not have denied an employee’s request to telecommute during the
final 10 weeks of her pregnancy because the request was a “reasonable
accommodation” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the 6th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-9lWpwM7KsmA/WtT1DQrchOI/AAAAAAAAAvM/T_vJcHX8insqziAR1rhfTOQ1Rl38lvs5ACLcBGAs/s1600/pregnancy%2Bblog.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="800" height="320" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-9lWpwM7KsmA/WtT1DQrchOI/AAAAAAAAAvM/T_vJcHX8insqziAR1rhfTOQ1Rl38lvs5ACLcBGAs/s320/pregnancy%2Bblog.png" width="320" /></a></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The decision in <a href="http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0034p-06.pdf"><i>Mosby-Meachem
v Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division</i></a><span style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"> affirmed a jury verdict for the employee of more than $110,000,
including compensatory damages and back pay.</span></span></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Notably, the decision was issued
three years after the 6th Circuit’s ruling in <a href="http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0066p-06.pdf"><i>EEOC v
Ford Motor Co</i></a>. In that case, an <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">en
banc</i> 6th Circuit held that telecommuting is <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">not</i> a reasonable accommodation, unless an employee shows that
regular attendance in the workplace and face-to-face interaction are not
essential elements of the job. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: large;">Complications During Pregnancy</span><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 7.5pt;">
<span style="color: black; line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: small;"> </span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">The plaintiff was an in-house attorney for Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Division (MLG&W). Although the plaintiff’s supervisor had instituted
a written policy that required in-office attendance for employees, some
employees still worked from home. In fact, at one point, the plaintiff telecommuted
for two weeks while recovering from surgery, without any incident.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 7.5pt;">
<span style="color: black; line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> The plaintiff had suffered
three miscarriages and began having complications when she became pregnant the
fourth time. As a result, her doctors placed her on bed rest for the final 10
weeks of her pregnancy. When the plaintiff requested that MLG&W allow her
to work remotely during these 10 weeks, the company’s ADA Committee denied the
request. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 7.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: black; line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>The plaintiff then sued MLG&W for discrimination. A
jury found that MLG&W violated the ADA by denying the plaintiff’s reasonable
request to telecommute. The jury awarded the </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">plaintiff </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">$92,000 in compensatory damages and
$18,184.32 in back pay. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 7.5pt;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">MLG&W appealed. </span></span><span style="color: #182622; font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 7.5pt; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit; font-size: large;">Telecommuting Is A ‘Reasonable
Accommodation’</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 7.5pt;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">MLG&W
argued</span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; line-height: 200%;"> the jury did not have a sufficient basis to find that the
plaintiff could perform all her essential job functions from home.</span><span style="line-height: 200%;"> The 6th Circuit disagreed, concluding
the plaintiff’s evidence of discrimination “undermined” the evidence presented
by MLG&W and “independently supported” the jury’s finding that she could
perform the essential functions of her job remotely for 10 weeks. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 7.5pt;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In
particular, the 6th Circuit</span><span style="line-height: 200%;"> emphasized that several MLG&W
employees, as well as outside counsel who worked with the plaintiff, testified
they believed the plaintiff could perform her essential job functions from home.</span><span style="line-height: 200%;"> <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 15.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Addressing
its 2015 ruling in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">EEOC v Ford Motor Co</i>,
the 6th Circuit noted that decision did not “expressly” preclude teleworking in
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">all</i> cases, particularly when an
employee asks to work from home for a “finite period of time,” as the plaintiff
did in this case. Accordingly, “a jury could have reasonably concluded from the
evidence presented at trial that [the plaintiff] could perform all the
essential functions of her job remotely for ten weeks,” the 6th Circuit held.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 15.0pt; mso-margin-top-alt: auto;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In
addition, the 6th Circuit denied MLG&W’s request for a new trial. The Court
said that, given the amount of evidence supporting the plaintiff’s claim, the
lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the jury’s verdict was
not contrary to the weight of the evidence.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> The
6th Circuit also rejected MLG&W’s argument that the plaintiff was not
entitled to back pay because her law license had been briefly suspended and,
thus, she was “unqualified” to perform the functions of her job. The Court
pointed out it was undisputed that, had MLG&W not denied the plaintiff’s
requested accommodation, she would have received her full pay for work she had performed.
In addition, the Court noted the potential unlicensed practice of law issue is
for the Tennessee Bar to address – not the judiciary.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Memphis, TN, USA35.1495343 -90.048980134.7339688 -90.6944271 35.5650998 -89.40353309999999tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-11822158033496286452018-04-03T11:45:00.000-04:002018-04-03T12:03:39.500-04:00Georgia Court of Appeals Holds that a Spouse Living in Michigan May Not File for Custody During a Family Vacation in Georgia<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-CA style='font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;line-height:200%;
mso-ansi-language:EN-CA'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1</span><![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;line-height:200%'><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0YWdl0PBEVU/WsOR6VxDVAI/AAAAAAAAAto/uccXhsUaF4UR5KtBzCM0WY72EexGktUlwCLcBGAs/s1600/Michigan.Georgia.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="800" height="320" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-0YWdl0PBEVU/WsOR6VxDVAI/AAAAAAAAAto/uccXhsUaF4UR5KtBzCM0WY72EexGktUlwCLcBGAs/s320/Michigan.Georgia.png" width="320" /></a><span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-size: 12pt;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">A recent Georgia Court of Appeals decision resolves a
two-year-long jurisdictional dispute between spouses regarding whether, under
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), their
custody case should proceed in Michigan or Georgia. The parties had
undisputedly been living in the Mid-West (the husband traveled between
Wisconsin, Michigan, and Indiana for work) until the wife decided not to return
from Georgia with the children after a family vacation. She filed a complaint
for custody in Georgia, and subsequently, the husband filed a divorce complaint
in Michigan. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>In
February 2016, the Michigan trial court dismissed the custody case in Michigan,
finding that under the UCCJEA jurisdiction was proper in Georgia because the
Georgia case had been filed first.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On
October 10, 2016, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. <i>Bowman v Bowman</i>,
<a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20161110_c331870_54_331870.opn.pdf">Docket No. 331870</a>. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred because
it should have followed the procedure stated in MCL 722.1206 for a
child-custody proceeding commenced when a child-custody proceeding has already
been commenced in a court of another state with jurisdiction in substantial
conformity with the UCCJEA. Specifically, MCL 722.1206 requires the court to
communicate with the court of the other state, and that court of the other
state may determine whether it will exercise jurisdiction.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>On
remand the Michigan trial court communicated with the Georgia trial court, and
the trial courts decided that Georgia would exercise jurisdiction. However, the
husband appealed the Georgia trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction to the
Georgia Court of Appeals.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Meanwhile,
the Michigan trial court had to determine whether the divorce case could remain
in Michigan without the custody portion of the divorce case. The trial court
simply dismissed the case because the custody case was to be in Georgia, but
the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had to
consider whether the husband satisfied the residency requirements for a
divorce. <i>Bowman v Bowman</i>, <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20180213_c339702_26_339702.opn.pdf">Docket No. 339702</a>.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="mso-tab-count: 1;"> </span>Most
recently, on March 6, 2018, the Georgia Court of Appeals issued a decision
holding that the Georgia trial court did not have jurisdiction. <i>Bowman v
Bowman</i>, <a href="https://efast.gaappeals.us/download?filingId=f1c9e441-a9f0-4a02-af35-38f99c3b5525">Case No. A17A2082</a>. The Georgia Court of Appeals noted that at the
time the wife filed the custody petition, the only connections between the
children and Georgia were that one of the children was born there, they had
grandparents and other family there, and they had visited those grandparents in
Georgia in the past. These were not significant connections sufficient to
satisfy the UCCJEA and Georgia could not exercise jurisdiction because
significant connections existed between the children and Michigan as determined
by the Michigan trial court. Thus, the Georgia Court of Appeals remanded the
case for dismissal.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> After
two years, and three appellate decisions in two separate states, the courts
have finally come to the conclusion that a spouse may not simply file a custody
petition in another state while visiting for a vacation.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<br />Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Van Buren County, MI, USA42.2459665 -86.01215730000001341.493674500000004 -87.303050800000008 42.9982585 -84.721263800000017tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-80188877537539618282018-03-26T12:10:00.000-04:002018-03-29T15:10:44.442-04:00Federal Appeals Court Revives Michigan Transgender Bias Suit<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Discrimination based on a person’s
transgender status is discrimination based on sex and is prohibited under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
ruled.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">The decision in </span><a href="http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0045p-06.pdf"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">EEOC
v R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.</span></i></a> <span style="line-height: 200%;">reinstated a funeral director’s
transgender bias claim against the Michigan funeral home that had fired her. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 200%;">In its ruling, the </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">6th Circuit rejected the
funeral home’s argument that it was protected by the </span><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-21B"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Religious
Freedom Restoration Act</span></a><span style="line-height: 200%;"> (RFRA). The funeral home’s owner claimed
that employing the director, who was biologically male but was transitioning to
female, went against his Christian beliefs.</span><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: 15.0pt; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="letter-spacing: .15pt;">The decision comes on the heels of two rulings out
of the </span><a href="https://schnaderworks.com/2018/02/27/2nd-cir-rules-sexual-orientation-discrimination-covered-under-title-vii/"><span style="letter-spacing: .15pt;">2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals</span></a><span style="letter-spacing: .15pt;"> and </span><a href="https://www.lawandtheworkplace.com/2017/04/seventh-circuit-becomes-first-federal-court-of-appeals-to-hold-that-sexual-orientation-discrimination-is-prohibited-under-title-vii/"><span style="letter-spacing: .15pt;">7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals</span></a><span style="letter-spacing: .15pt;">. Both of those decisions held that </span>discrimination
based on sexual orientation is prohibited under Title VII. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" style="background: white; margin-top: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Fired Funeral Director</span><span style="font-size: 14pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Aimee Stephens, a funeral director </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">at
<span style="letter-spacing: .15pt;">R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, was
born male. She was fired from her job after informing the funeral home’s owner
that she intended to transition from male to female and intended to present as
a female at work. <o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 200%;">After being discharged, Stephens filed a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), asserting discrimination
based on sexual orientation. The EEOC investigated and filed suit against the
funeral home in the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII</span><span style="line-height: 200%;">. The funeral home filed a motion to
dismiss the EEOC’s lawsuit, arguing there was no valid sex discrimination claim.
The funeral home maintained the RFRA precluded the enforcement of Title VII because
doing so would “substantially burden” the funeral home owner’s exercise of his religious
beliefs. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 200%;">The </span><a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/michigan/miedce/2:2014cv13710/295088/76/"><span style="letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 200%;">Eastern District of Michigan</span></a><span style="letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 200%;"> dismissed the EEOC’s complaint, holding that </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">transgender
status is not a protected trait under Title VII and that the EEOC could not
file a discrimination claim based solely on the plaintiff’s transgender and/or
transitioning status. In so ruling, the Eastern District accepted the funeral
home’s argument that the RFRA applied.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">On appeal, the 6th Circuit reversed. According to the
Court, the Eastern District improperly held that a claim cannot be pursued under
Title VII based on transgender/transitioning status.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0.15pt;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">“Stereotypical Notions”</span></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="letter-spacing: 0.15pt; line-height: 200%;">In its decision, the 6th Circuit explained that sexual</span><span style="line-height: 200%;">
stereotyping and transgender discrimination are “based on the non-conformance
of an individual’s gender identity and appearance with sex-based norms or
expectations.” As a result, discrimination because of an individual’s
transgender status “is always based on gender stereotypes: the stereotype that
individuals will conform their appearance and behavior – whether their dress,
the name they use, or other ways they present themselves – to the sex assigned
them at birth,” the Court said. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">According
to the 6th Circuit, “it is analytically impossible to fire an employee based on
that employee’s status as a transgender person without being motivated, at
least in part, by the employee’s sex.” The Court explained that an employer
cannot discriminate based on transgender status without imposing its
stereotypical notions of how “sexual organs and gender identity ought to align”
and there is “no way to disaggregate discrimination on the basis of transgender
status from discrimination on the basis of gender non-conformity.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Rejecting
the funeral home’s claim that the RFRA precluded enforcement of Title VII, the
6th Circuit pointed out the RFRA prohibits the government from “substantially
burdening” a person’s exercise of religion, unless the government demonstrates
the burden is:</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
</div>
<br />
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest, and</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.</span></li>
</ul>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In
this case, the 6th Circuit said the funeral home’s argument that the “burden” in
connection with Stephens presenting as female – namely that it (1) would be a
“distraction” for the deceased’s family members and (2) would force the funeral
home to violate the owner’s faith – was not “substantial” within the meaning of
RFRA. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Addressing
the “distraction” argument, the 6th Circuit said a religious claimant “cannot
rely on customers’ presumed biases to establish a substantial burden under
RFRA.” Regarding the “faith” argument, the Court explained that allowing Stephens
to wear attire that reflects a conception of gender that is at odds with the
owner’s religious beliefs was not a substantial burden because “tolerating
Stephens’ understanding of her sex and gender identity is not tantamount to
supporting it.” The Court added, “[T]he fact that [the funeral home owner]
sincerely believes that he is being compelled to make such an endorsement does
not make it so.” <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">In
conclusion, the 6th Circuit noted that even if a substantial burden was involved,
enforcing Title VII was the least restrictive means of furthering the
compelling interest of preventing workplace discrimination. “Where the
government has developed a comprehensive scheme to effectuate its goal of
eradicating discrimination based on sex, including sex stereotypes, it makes
sense that the only way to achieve the scheme’s objectives is through its
enforcement,” the Court wrote</span></span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Wayne County, MI, USA42.2790746 -83.33618799999999341.9028961 -83.981635 42.6552531 -82.690740999999989tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-75336730740830450202018-03-21T11:30:00.000-04:002018-03-29T15:14:51.761-04:00Sex Offender Registration Act’s Retroactive Application Violated Due Process<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">It was unconstitutional to retroactively apply Michigan’s
Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) to a defendant who, at age 19, had pleaded
guilty to a sex offense under a state diversionary statute, the Michigan
Supreme Court has ruled.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">In <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">People v Temelkoski</i>,
the Michigan Supreme Court emphasized that, when prosecuting crimes, the state must
adhere to the promises it makes to defendants who waive their right to a jury
trial and plead guilty to a criminal offense under the </span><a href="http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(4cmmmutedagad0orxfe1pvjn))/mileg.aspx?page=GetObject&objectname=mcl-762-11"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Holmes Youthful Trainee Act</span></a><span style="line-height: 200%;"> (HYTA). <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center; vertical-align: baseline;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Plea Deal Under Diversionary Statute<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">The defendant in the case pleaded guilty in 1994 to one
count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of </span><a href="http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(uqqbxamilsv5f4zukfcpbvpm))/mileg.aspx?page=GetObject&objectname=mcl-750-520c"><span style="line-height: 200%;">MCL 750.520c(1)(a)</span></a></span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">. Because he was 19 years old at the
time, the defendant was subject to HYTA. Under HYTA, certain youth offenders
may be assigned youthful trainee status and ultimately have their cases
dismissed and their records sealed. At the time the defendant pleaded guilty,
HYTA provided that the assignment of an individual to the status of youthful
trainee was not a conviction.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-EP20S2x09rU/WrFGoenDjQI/AAAAAAAAAtE/8MEL69Y2kJ8mWeT5oG4lbl1TgF_VFYzEACLcBGAs/s1600/HYTA%2B%2526%2BSORA.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="800" height="320" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-EP20S2x09rU/WrFGoenDjQI/AAAAAAAAAtE/8MEL69Y2kJ8mWeT5oG4lbl1TgF_VFYzEACLcBGAs/s320/HYTA%2B%2526%2BSORA.png" width="320" /></span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">The year following the defendant’s HYTA sentencing, </span><a href="http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(ooiuaiowxvyu4qkvnyjxjdef))/mileg.aspx?page=GetObject&objectname=mcl-28-722"><span style="line-height: 200%;">SORA</span></a></span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"> went into effect. Because SORA was retroactively
applied, it defined the defendant’s youthful trainee adjudication as a “conviction”
that required him to register as a sex offender for 25 years. When the defendant
completed his HYTA youthful trainee program in 1997, his case was dismissed
with prejudice and his record was sealed pursuant to HYTA. However, the
defendant remained a registered sex offender under SORA.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Over the years, various amendments to SORA began imposing more
restrictions on the defendant, including lifetime sex offender registration.
Then in 2014, the Michigan Legislature amended SORA to exclude successfully
discharged youthful trainees from sex offender registration requirements.
However, that amendment was not made retroactive and, as a result, the
defendant remained on the sex offender registry.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">The defendant filed a motion in Wayne County Circuit Court to
be removed from the sex offender registry. The trial court granted the defendant’s
motion, finding that SORA constituted punishment and was an ex post facto law
as applied to the defendant.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center; vertical-align: baseline;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Court of
Appeals: SORA Not ‘Punishment’<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">The </span><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20141021_c313670(79)_rptr_140o-313670-final.pdf"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Michigan Court of Appeals reversed</span></a><span style="line-height: 200%;"> (Docket No. </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">313670)</span>
<span style="line-height: 200%;">the trial court’s decision, finding
that </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">SORA
did not impose a punishment on the defendant. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">“SORA has not been
regarded in our history and traditions as punishment, it does not impose
affirmative disabilities or restraints, it does not promote the traditional
aims of punishment, and it has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose
and is not excessive with respect to this purpose,” the Court of Appeals wrote.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">“Defendant … has failed
to show by ‘the clearest proof’ that SORA is ‘so punitive either in purpose or
effect’ that it negates the Legislature’s intent to deem it civil,” the Court
of Appeals said. “Accordingly, as applied to defendant, SORA does not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause or amount to cruel or unusual punishment because it
does not impose punishment.”</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center; vertical-align: baseline;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 14.0pt;">Michigan
Supreme Court: Due Process Violation<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in
a 5-2 </span><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/sct/public/orders/150643_150_01.pdf"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Order</span></a><span style="line-height: 200%;"> (Docket No. </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">150643).
According to the Court, the</span><span style="line-height: 200%;">
retroactive application of SORA to the defendant, who had pleaded guilty to a
sex offense under HYTA, was a violation of due process under both the Michigan
and U.S. Constitutions. <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">In making its ruling, the Court relied on the defendant’s reasonable
expectations under his plea agreement. Citing </span><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/404/257/case.html"><i><span style="border: 1pt none; line-height: 200%; padding: 0in;">Santobello v New York</span></i></a></span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">, 404 US 257 (1971), the Court
explained that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” The justices
observed that, pursuant to <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Santobello</i>,
the defendant reasonably relied on the HYTA adjudication and the “express
promise” that when he successfully completed his youthful trainee requirements,
he would not have a conviction on his record.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">The Michigan Supreme Court also noted that the defendant
pleaded guilty to the primary charge against him – and that he did so after
being screened for HYTA eligibility. “Because </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">defendant pleaded
guilty on the basis of the inducement provided in HYTA as effective in 1994
(i.e., before SORA’s effective date), was assigned to HYTA training by the
trial judge, and successfully completed his HYTA training, retroactive
application of SORA deprived defendant of the benefits under HYTA to which he
was entitled and therefore violated his constitutional right to due process,”
the Court concluded.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The Michigan Supreme Court decided <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Temelkoski</i> on due process grounds and, as a result, did not address
the unconstitutional punishment argument. However, in dicta, the Court
indicated how it might decide the issue when it said: “It is undisputed that
registration under SORA constitutes a civil disability.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Justice Kurtis T. Wilder dissented from the Court’s order, saying
he would have remanded the matter for further factual development. According to
Justice Wilder, two questions needed to be answered: </span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">(1)
whether the defendant was promised benefits derived from his assignment to, and
subsequent release from, youthful trainee status, and (2) whether the defendant
was <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">actually induced</i> to plead guilty because
of that promise. </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">“In my view, the record
before us is insufficient to conclude, at this stage, that a violation of
defendant’s due process rights has occurred,” Justice Wilder wrote, joined by </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">Justice Brian K. Zahra. “</span><span style="line-height: 200%;">While
defendant acknowledges these multiple deficiencies, he asks this Court to
assume that his plea was induced by his expectation of HYTA’s benefits. But to
make this assumption based on the sequence of events and surviving documents – and,
importantly, not an actual record – that (1) a promise was made to defendant
and (2) that such a promise induced defendant’s plea runs contrary to this
Court’s firmly established jurisprudence.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; vertical-align: baseline;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Justice Wilder also expressed concern that extending <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Santobello</i> to statutory provisions, like
HYTA, contradicted longstanding jurisprudence. “</span><span style="line-height: 200%;">Even if defendant had
an expectation that he would receive the benefits of HYTA … and the subsequent
enactment of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) … imposed a new liability
based on defendant’s past acts, he has failed to show that the enactment of
SORA was a clear violation of his constitutional right to due process,” the
justice wrote.</span></span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Wayne County, MI, USA42.2790746 -83.33618799999999341.9028961 -83.981635 42.6552531 -82.690740999999989tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-69197702495789929562018-03-14T11:25:00.000-04:002018-03-14T11:44:16.804-04:00Presumed Father Can Challenge Paternity For The First Time In Divorce Proceedings<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The
three-year time limit for filing a paternity challenge under the Revocation of
Paternity Act (RPA) does not apply when the presumed father raises the issue in
a divorce action, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">In
</span><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20180222_c336193_38_336193.opn.pdf"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Taylor v Taylor</span></i></a><span style="line-height: 200%;">
(Docket No. 336193), a published decision, the Court of Appeals was asked to determine
whether a paternity challenge always has to be brought within three years of
the child’s birth pursuant to </span><a href="https://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(pqls0g1z1g04oovwvqvo3xmv))/mileg.aspx?page=getobject&objectname=mcl-722-1441"><span style="line-height: 200%;">MCL
722.1441(2)</span></a><span style="line-height: 200%;">. That part of the RPA says: <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; margin-left: 1.0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-top: 0in;">
<i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">“If a child has a presumed father, a court may
determine that the child is born out of wedlock for the purpose of establishing
the child’s paternity if an action is filed by the presumed father within 3
years after the child’s birth or if the presumed father raises the issue in an
action for divorce or separate maintenance between the presumed father and the
mother.”<o:p></o:p></span></i></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The
parties in <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Taylor</i> were married in
2000 and the youngest child was born in 2011 while the parties were separated.
Both parties agreed, and DNA testing established, that the defendant is not the
biological father of the youngest child. The plaintiff filed for divorce in
2016, when the youngest child was 5 years old. Thereafter, the defendant filed
a motion for a paternity determination. The trial court denied the motion, finding
it lacked jurisdiction because the defendant did not raise the paternity issue
within three years of the child’s birth. In so ruling, the trial court interpreted
§1441(2) as requiring a paternity issue be raised within three years of the
child’s birth.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The
defendant appealed, arguing the three-year limit did not apply if the paternity
issue was raised in a divorce action. The Court of Appeals agreed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">In
its analysis, the Court of Appeals noted that §1441(2) uses the disjunctive
word “or” and that two alternatives for challenging paternity are provided:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
</div>
<br />
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">when “an action is filed by the presumed
father within 3 years after the child’s birth.”</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">when “the presumed father raises the issue
in an action for divorce or separate maintenance between the presumed father
and the mother.”</span></li>
</ul>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The
three-year limit only applies to the first option, and <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Taylor</i> involves the second option, the Court of Appeals explained. Looking
at the language of §1441(2), the appeals court said there was no “clear
indication” the Legislature intended to use the word “and” rather than “or.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">According
to the Court of Appeals, to rule otherwise would create the additional
restriction that there must be a divorce or separate maintenance action in
order to raise the issue. “[T]here is nothing in the statute which would
suggest that this is what the Legislature intended,” the appeals court
observed.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Thus,
“we are left with only one rather unremarkable conclusion: the Legislature
intended exactly what it said,” the Court of Appeals wrote. “The presumed
father may raise the issue in a paternity action filed within three years of
the child’s birth OR in a divorce action (without regard to how old the child
is).</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 200%;">”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<br />Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Washtenaw County, MI, USA42.3076493 -83.84730150000001541.9315518 -84.492748500000019 42.6837468 -83.20185450000001tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-37415722984947072442018-03-09T11:10:00.000-05:002018-03-09T11:16:26.189-05:00Texas Judge’s Electrocution of Defendant During Criminal Trial Was a Stunning Constitutional Violation<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The Texas Court of Appeals in El
Paso issued an astounding but much deserved opinion in a criminal case, <a href="https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4403958/Opinion-in-Terry-Lee-Morris-Case.pdf">Morris v Texas,_ SW3d _(Feb. 28, 2018)</a>. In that
case, a criminal defendant had been convicted of soliciting the sexual performance
of a child. Apparently before the criminal trial, the trial judge had decided
to make the defendant wear a stun belt. It appears that the defendant had also
previously filed a lawsuit against that judge and also against his defense
attorney.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
During the course of the jury
trial, the criminal defendant and trial judge entered into several “heated exchanges”
where the defendant (not through his counsel) was objecting to the fact that he
had to wear a stun belt. He also pointed out that he had mental health issues
and that he was on 17 pills for his mental health disability and the use of the
stun belt would exacerbate his medical condition. In fact, the defendant
proclaimed “you’re torturing a MHMR client”. The judge did not like what the
criminal defendant was saying and on three separate occasions, each time out of
the presence of the jury, the trial judge ordered the bailiff to activate the
stun belt because the defendant was not “behaving”.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-pKE2FYtDoSM/WqKxlP1tf2I/AAAAAAAAAso/QqAD7kxaGwMimP8CQb9GnmJx2ZvfgP0RgCLcBGAs/s1600/180307-Messer-texas-judge-express__wtxcqi.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="833" data-original-width="1480" height="225" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-pKE2FYtDoSM/WqKxlP1tf2I/AAAAAAAAAso/QqAD7kxaGwMimP8CQb9GnmJx2ZvfgP0RgCLcBGAs/s400/180307-Messer-texas-judge-express__wtxcqi.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The defendant objected strongly
each time the judge administered the stun. Eventually the defendant was taken
out of the courtroom and he refused to come back even though the court offered
that he could rejoin the proceedings if he would behave himself.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The El Paso Court of Appeals
focused on the fact that the judge used the electrocution of the defendant to
control decorum in the courtroom (to make the defendant “behave”) and not for
any security or safety measure. Even though the trial judge stated after the
fact that he was concerned for the safety in the courtroom, the Court of
Appeals did not find that credible based on the judge's previous comments at
the preliminary examination and during the process of ordering the
electrocution three times during the trial.<span style="background: white; font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> </span>“Because the trial transcript clearly
shows that the trial judge, during a heated exchange with the defendant outside
the presence of the jury, ordered his bailiff to electrocute the defendant
three times with a stun belt—not for legitimate security purposes, but solely
as a show of the court’s power as the defendant asked the court to stop
“torturing” him—we harbor grave doubts as to whether Morris’ trial comported
with basic constitutional mandates. As such, we have no choice but to
overturn Morris’ conviction and remand for a new trial.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
While this case is astounding, what
perhaps is even more stunning, is that not one of the other judicial
officers in the courtroom said anything when the trial judge was ordering these
electrocutions to occur three separate times. The bailiff followed the
instructions without question. The prosecutor did not seem to have a problem
with it and remained silent. Most disappointingly, the defendant's own attorney
raised no objection at all to the electrocution of his client. If that wasn't
bad enough, the defense attorney’s comments to the jury during closing
arguments were even worse. The defense attorney stated in closing: “You might
not like me. You might hate Terry Morris. One of you asked why he was wearing
jail clothes. He can’t behave. He smarted off at the judge. That's why he’s not
in here. You might hate him. It’s a pretty despicable offense. But in the game
of balls and strikes, your oath that you all swore to was not the
consideration. Is the ball over the plate or not? . . . The evidence ought to
be pretty strong if it’s beyond a reasonable doubt. That’s the standard. You
may not like Terry Morris. I don’t like him. Kind of rude. Smells bad, you
know. Is he guilty of this? He might be. The question is not the answer to any
of those things.”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In addition to remaining silent
while the judge electrocuted his client, the defense attorney also threw his
client under the bus during closing. </span><o:p></o:p></div>
<br />Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-27158713975893719532018-03-05T14:15:00.000-05:002018-03-05T14:21:36.429-05:00Trial Court Misapplied “Preponderance Of Evidence” Standard To Modify Custody<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">A
trial court erroneously used a “preponderance of the evidence” standard to
determine it was in the child’s best interest to change the established
custodial arrangement, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled in a 2-1
decision that may create more confusion as to how to apply the burden in
custody cases.</span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
In
<a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20180130_c338810_33_338810.opn.pdf"><i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">Griffin v Griffin</i></a> (published
opinion, Docket No. 338810), the Court of Appeals said the “key” in custody
modification cases is for the trial court to first find, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the proposed custodial arrangement is in the child’s
best interests. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
The
Court added, however, that to do this properly, trial courts must determine
whether the proposed change is in the child’s best interests when compared to
the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">status quo</i> – not when compared
with the parties’ suggested modifications, the Court of Appeals reasoned. The
Court’s analysis is unique among family law cases and, although attempting to
resolve a difficult question, may create more confusion among courts and
practitioners instead.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
The
trial court wrongly applied a preponderance of the evidence standard when
weighing the statutory best interest factors, Judge Michael J. Kelly concluded,
joined by Judge Brock A. Swartzle. As a result, the trial court’s ruling was reversed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
Judge
William B. Murphy dissented from the majority opinion, saying any error by the
trial court was harmless and “reversal is unwarranted.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in; text-align: center;">
<strong><span style="border: none windowtext 1.0pt; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-border-alt: none windowtext 0in; padding: 0in;">Motions To Change Custody Arrangement</span></strong><b><span style="border: none windowtext 1.0pt; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-border-alt: none windowtext 0in; padding: 0in;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
The
plaintiff and the defendant were divorced and had one son together. They shared
equal physical custody, using a two-week on/two-week off schedule.</div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
The
defendant is an active duty member of the U.S. Coast Guard. In January 2016,
she received orders to report to a new station in Willowbrook, Illinois, almost
four hours from the plaintiff’s home in Holt, Michigan. The trial court entered
an order allowing the defendant to change her legal residence with the child
from Auburn Hills, Michigan, to Willowbrook, Illinois. The order indicated the
child’s legal residence with the plaintiff would remain in Holt and the
existing parenting-time schedule would continue.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
In
January 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify the custody arrangement.
He argued that, because the child would be 5 years old and starting kindergarten,
the child could not continue to split his time every two weeks, and that the
child’s need to start school was a material change in circumstances necessitating
a review of the custody arrangement. The plaintiff argued the best interest
factors in MCL 722.23 weighed in favor of granting him full legal and physical
custody, and awarding the defendant reasonable parenting time. The defendant
responded to the motion by also requesting a modification of the custodial
arrangement. She asserted the best interest factors weighed in favor of her
having full legal and physical custody of the child.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-AAcerWP2mlE/Wp2VczgyRrI/AAAAAAAAAsM/nAiQ7AiuNJYqtKCFSYxkA30TJ1sIa8O0wCLcBGAs/s1600/Joint-Custody.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="281" data-original-width="426" height="210" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-AAcerWP2mlE/Wp2VczgyRrI/AAAAAAAAAsM/nAiQ7AiuNJYqtKCFSYxkA30TJ1sIa8O0wCLcBGAs/s320/Joint-Custody.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
After
a Friend of the Court (FOC) investigation, the FOC recommended the child reside
with the plaintiff during the school year and the defendant be awarded
parenting time according to a holiday schedule, which included summer break. Both
parties objected to the FOC’s recommendation. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
The
trial court held a hearing and awarded primary custody to the defendant during
the school year and primary custody to the plaintiff during the summer. The
plaintiff was also awarded custody during spring break, the week of
Thanksgiving and one-half of Christmas break. In making its decision, the trial
court applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, finding that the change
in custody was in the child’s best interests. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
The
Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial court applied the wrong
evidentiary standard in its analysis. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in; text-align: center;">
<strong><span style="border: none windowtext 1.0pt; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%; mso-border-alt: none windowtext 0in; padding: 0in;">Erroneous Standard Applied</span></strong><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
Judge
Kelly, writing for the Court of Appeals majority, explained that when a parent
moves for a change of custody, proper cause must first be established to
revisit the original custody arrangement. <em><span style="border: none windowtext 1.0pt; font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-border-alt: none windowtext 0in; padding: 0in;">Once this </span></em>threshold is met, he said, then the trial court
must determine whether the child has an established custodial environment.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
“Where
no established custodial environment exists, the trial court may change custody
if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the change would be in
the child’s best interests,” the judge wrote.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
However,
when an established custodial environment does exist, Judge Kelly said a trial court
is not to change the established custodial environment unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s best interests.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
In
this case, Judge Kelly explained, the trial court, on its own, determined that although
a change in custody would alter the established custodial environment, thereby requiring
a clear and convincing standard, it was only required to apply a preponderance
of the evidence standard. According to the judge, the trial court reasoned that
because the plaintiff and the defendant had “the same” burden of proof and a change
had to be made, it was proper to weigh the best interest factors under a
preponderance of the evidence standard.</div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
Looking
at the facts, the trial court found that neither the plaintiff’s proposed
change nor the defendant’s proposed change was, by clear and convincing
evidence, superior to the other’s. However, the Court of Appeals noted for the
first time in this published case that MCL 722.27(1)(c) does not require that
one parent’s proposal be better than the other parent’s by a clear and convincing
standard. Thus, the trial court was not tasked with comparing the proposals to
each other and deciding which was better, Judge Kelly emphasized.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
Instead,
Judge Kelly said the trial court was required to find that the change in
custody was in the child’s best interests when compared to the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">status quo</i>. “[T]he child’s established
custodial environment is the <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">status quo</i>,
so in order to modify it the court must find by clear and convincing evidence
that the change is in the child’s best interests when compared to the status
quo, not when compared to every other conceivable or suggested modification,”
the Court of Appeals wrote. “In doing so, the court is free to adopt either party’s
proposal in whole or in part, but it is equally permissible for the court to
fashion an entirely new custody arrangement or to maintain the existing custody
arrangement. The key is that the court must first find by clear and convincing
evidence that the new custodial arrangement is in the child’s best interests.”</div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
As
a result, Judge Kelly found the trial court erred by applying a preponderance
of the evidence standard when weighing the best interest factors in MCL 722.23
and, therefore, reversal was required.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
Unfortunately,
this holding does not resolve the problem the Court of Appeals attempted to
resolve. It seems required that at some point each parent’s proposed custody
arrangement must be compared against the other. If not, what happens if both
proposals are clearly and convincingly better than the status quo? By
attempting to avoid the problem of neither proposal being clearly and
convincingly better than the other, the Court has unfortunately simply created
more questions and will likely cause more confusion in the trial courts.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%;">Absences Due to Active Duty Status<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
The
Court of Appeals also construed a portion of MCL 722.27(1)(c) that provides, “If
a motion for change of custody is filed while a parent is active duty, the
court shall not consider a parent’s absence due to that active duty status in a
best interest of the child determination.” The Court’s analysis of this provision
in particular was unusual. Without any indication in MCL 722.27(1)(c) to
support it, the Court concluded that “a parent’s absence” means only “current”
absences, not potential <i style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal;">future</i> ones.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
The
Court based its conclusion on a comparison to MCL 722.27(4), which mentions
“future deployments.” Thus, the Court held that the trial court could consider
potential future relocations due to active duty status in making its custody
decision.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div align="center" style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 200%;">‘Harmless Error’<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
In
his dissent, Judge Murphy explained that, if the trial court’s ultimate
decision did not result in a true change of the established custodial
environment, then applying the preponderance of the evidence standard would be “legally
sound.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
“Assuming
that there was a change in the established custodial environment and that the
clear-and-convincing standard was applicable, I fail to see the need to reverse
and remand the case, as any error would be harmless,” he wrote. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
In
particular, Judge Murphy pointed out the trial court recognized that a change
in custody had to occur, and that the child’s best interests could only be
served by altering the existing custody arrangement.</div>
<div style="background: white; line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
“And
considering that the trial court found in favor of defendant on four of the
child custody best-interest factors, MCL 722.23, with the remaining factors
being even, except for one, the court would be forced again to rule in favor of
defendant, even on the clear-and-convincing standard,” the judge said.
“Reversal is unwarranted.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Ingham County, MI, USA42.6468943 -84.35420490000001342.2728663 -84.999651900000018 43.0209223 -83.708757900000009tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-15981087196983462692018-02-27T14:00:00.000-05:002018-02-27T14:24:24.657-05:00Michigan Court of Appeals Judge Cautions: Courts Must Not Raise Issues For The Parties<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Same-sex couple.
Domestic partnership declared. Donor insemination contract. Two children born
during the relationship. Domestic partnership terminated. Custody and
parenting-time dispute. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">All these statements apply
to <i>Sheardown v Guastella</i> </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">–</span><span style="line-height: 200%;"> a case the Michigan
Supreme Court declined to hear in January 2018 (Docket No. </span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/sct/public/orders/156931_31_01.pdf"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;">156931</span></a></span><span style="line-height: 200%;">)</span><span style="line-height: 200%;"> after the Michigan
Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 order, remanded the case for further briefing and analysis
(Docket No. </span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/coa/public/orders/2017/338089(24)_order.pdf"><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";">338089</span></a></span><span style="line-height: 200%;">).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><i><span style="line-height: 200%;">Sheardown</span></i><span style="line-height: 200%;"> is intriguing not because Michigan’s highest
court denied the appeal. Rather, it’s interesting because the Court of Appeals
– on its own initiative – ordered the parties to brief, and the trial court to
consider, whether MCL 722.22(i) is constitutional as applied to the facts of
the case, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in </span><i><span style="line-height: 200%;">Obergefell v Hodges</span></i><span style="line-height: 200%;">,
576 US___ (2015). </span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Notably, <i>Obergefell</i> was decided after the
plaintiff and the defendant in <i>Sheardown</i>
had ended their domestic partnership. In addition, <i>Obergefell</i> was not offered by either party as an argument on
appeal. </span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">In
fact, Court of Appeals Judge Christopher M. Murray pointed this out in his
dissent to the appellate majority’s order. He criticized the majority’s
decision to invoke an <i>Obergefell</i> analysis
on its own, noting </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">there may have been strategic reasons why the plaintiff did not
raise the issues that the Court of Appeals was now <i>sua sponte</i> requiring the parties to address on remand.</span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">‘Sheardown’ <o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The plaintiff and the defendant
in <i>Sheardown </i>were a same-sex couple.
Although they were never married, they were in a legally recognized domestic
partnership from 2010-2013, at which time the partnership was dissolved. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-xqHAPNNRpLM/Wo2vjJAIscI/AAAAAAAAAro/w6U05KQeuFMZE0uxYXvbP_L3n5aRWpm0QCLcBGAs/s1600/parenting%2Btime.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="800" height="320" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-xqHAPNNRpLM/Wo2vjJAIscI/AAAAAAAAAro/w6U05KQeuFMZE0uxYXvbP_L3n5aRWpm0QCLcBGAs/s320/parenting%2Btime.png" width="320" /></span></a><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">While they were
together, the plaintiff gave birth to a child in 2010 through a sperm donor. Both
the plaintiff and the defendant signed a donor insemination contract, which stated
the parties’ intent to raise the child together and for the plaintiff to adopt
the child after birth. However, the plaintiff never adopted the child. In 2011,
the defendant gave birth to another child through the same sperm donor. The
children were raised together as siblings.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">After the plaintiff and
the defendant ended their relationship, they enjoyed parenting time with each
other’s biological children. However, disagreements and parenting-time disputes
soon arose. In 2016, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Oakland County
Circuit Court for custody and parenting time with the defendant’s biological child.</span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Trial Court Ruling &
Reasoning<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">In the trial court, both
parties moved for summary disposition. Oakland County Circuit Judge Lisa
Langton, after conducting a hearing, granted summary disposition for the
defendant. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">First, the judge granted
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
She emphasized that, based on established case law, a third party does not have
standing to create a custody dispute “unless the third party is a guardian of
the child or has a substantive right of entitlement to custody of the child” (<i>Ruppel v Lesner</i>, 421 Mich 559 (1984)). In
addition, the Legislature </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">“has not created a</span><span style="line-height: 200%;"> </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">substantive
right to custody of a child on the basis</span><span style="line-height: 200%;"> </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">of the child’s residence
with someone other than a</span><span style="line-height: 200%;"> </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">parent, and this Court is not in a position to do so,”
she said.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Judge Langton also granted summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(5), finding the plaintiff did not have standing. </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">“Because
Plaintiff never adopted Defendant’s child, the law does not consider her a
parent for purposes of the Child Custody Act,” the judge wrote. “Essentially, …<i>
</i>she has no legal rights and interests regarding the minor child in this
case. Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff lacks the legal capacity to sue.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The judge further
held that summary disposition was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(8), failure to
state a claim for relief. “[T]he court’s analysis begins and concludes with two
facts,” she said. “First, … the parties were not in a legally protected
marriage at the time Defendant (or Plaintiff) gave birth to her biological
minor child. It may be true that the city of Ann Arbor granted them legal
recognition, but Plaintiff cites no authority that a city’s recognition
requires full faith and credit acknowledgment by the state. Second, Plaintiff
never adopted Defendant’s minor child. Under these grounds, the court finds
that no factual development could justify recovery under these circumstances.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">In addition, Judge Langton concluded the equitable parenting
doctrine was inapplicable in the case. She noted that the plaintiff claimed the
arguments presented were “shockingly archaic” and “contrary to the fundamental
rights of the LGBT community” under <i>Obergefell</i>.
The judge pointed out, however, that a critical factor of the equitable
parenting doctrine was missing in the case: the child must be born in wedlock.
Citing <i>Lake v Putnam</i>, 316 Mich App 247
(2016), the judge said: “</span><span style="line-height: 200%;">[I]t is, in our view, improper for a court
to impose, several years later, a marriage on a same-sex unmarried couple
simply because one party desires that we do so.” </span><span style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: center; text-autospace: none;">
<b><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Court of Appeals Remand
Order</span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The plaintiff appealed
the trial court’s decision. In her appellate brief, the plaintiff mentioned <i>Obergefell</i> in two instances: 1) to
explain that, prior to <i>Obergefell</i>,
same-sex couples in Michigan could not marry and, therefore, step-parent
adoption was unavailable, and 2) to assert that, prior to <i>Obergefell</i>, many same-sex couples relied on donor insemination
agreements to confer upon an individual the status of legal parent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Meanwhile, the
defendant argued on appeal that the plaintiff was asking the Court of Appeals to
hold that contracts like donor insemination agreements are legally enforceable
because, before <i>Obergefell,</i> Michigan did not permit same-sex couples to
marry or adopt each other’s children. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The defendant
further maintained the plaintiff waived her claims because she did not explain
why <i>Obergefell</i> applied, or why <i>Obergefell</i>
should be grounds for private and uncontrolled transfers of parental rights to
third parties. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">On its own motion,
a 2-1 Court of Appeals remanded <i>Sheardown</i>
“for consideration of whether MCL 722.22(i) is constitutional as applied to the
facts of this case, in light of <i>Obergefell</i>
… We order the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing this question in
the trial court.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-align: center; text-autospace: none;">
<b><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Courts Are Not Advocates</span></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">So why did the Court of Appeals majority instruct
the parties to file supplemental briefs in light of <i>Obergefell</i>, when <i>Obergefell</i>
was not the basis for the appellate arguments? <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">That is precisely the question that Judge Murray
posed in his dissent to the Court of Appeals order. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">First, Judge
Murray emphasized that courts are not advocates. “[W]e are not in the business
of raising issues for the parties,” he observed. And when it comes to
constitutional issues, “our Court – and of course the Supreme Court – has
emphasized that constitutional challenges to a statute may not be raised for
the first time on appeal.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Specifically,
Judge Murray noted the plaintiff in <i>Sheardown</i>
did not challenge the constitutionality of MCL 722.22(i) in her complaint, nor
did she raise the issue in any pleadings before the trial court. Rather, he
said the plaintiff’s argument in the trial court, and on appeal, was that a
signed contract established her rights as a parent. As a result, the trial
court did not decide any constitutional issue, he said.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Judge Murray also explained
the plaintiff’s constitutional argument on appeal was that she had a contract
establishing her as a parent and, thus, her constitutional rights as a parent under
<i>Troxel v Granville</i>, 530 US 57 (2000),
were violated because she was unable to pursue custody or parenting time. “That
is not the challenge to the statute raised by the [Court of Appeals] majority,”
he wrote. “And although plaintiff did cite to <i>Obergefell</i>, it was only for the proposition that when these parties
were in a relationship they were not allowed by state law to be married or to
adopt. True enough, but that does not raise a constitutional challenge to a
state statute on due process or equal protection grounds.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">According to Judge
Murray, there may have been “a very good reason” why the plaintiff did not bring
up the issue that was raised <i>sua sponte</i>
by the Court of Appeals majority. “Setting aside that her counsel could not
identify where this issue was raised, her counsel explicitly disavowed needing <i>Obergefell</i> to be retroactive to succeed,
and likewise seemed to agree with the proposition in <i>Lake v Putnam</i>, … that courts are ill-equipped to re-create what
could have occurred between a couple had they had the opportunity to marry
while they dated. So it could well be that plaintiff chose not to raise this
issue, and hedged her bet that the contract based claim to standing would
prevail.”</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">But even if that
was indeed the case, the Court of Appeals majority “has not let the parties’
control their own case, and the resulting delay and cost to resolving this
matter will only increase,” Judge Murray concluded. “It is wrong, and I dissent
from the majority’s decision to advocate on plaintiff’s behalf.” </span><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Oakland County, MI, USA42.592192399999988 -83.33618799999999341.844867399999984 -84.627081499999989 43.339517399999991 -82.0452945tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-2943189209293515752018-02-23T11:30:00.000-05:002018-02-27T14:25:00.705-05:00MCOA - Can Terminate Rights of Parent When Children Safely Living with Other Parent<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In this termination case, <i>In re </i>Jones, Minors, <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170914_c336271_41_336271.opn.pdf">No. 336271</a>, the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) appealed the Oakland County
Circuit Court’s order dismissing the petition to adjudicate and terminate the
parental rights of the respondent-mother to her three minor children. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The Michigan Court of Appeals
(MCOA) reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The Michigan
Supreme Court denied the request for leave to appeal by the mother.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-im5PYzTFHn4/Wo2R6fWt0eI/AAAAAAAAArM/Pw0g9yWrmugaPRz_l25_xIC9zHGvqtIZACLcBGAs/s1600/houses.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="566" data-original-width="799" height="225" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-im5PYzTFHn4/Wo2R6fWt0eI/AAAAAAAAArM/Pw0g9yWrmugaPRz_l25_xIC9zHGvqtIZACLcBGAs/s320/houses.png" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>FACTS: </b>The facts are that three of the children live with their
father who was granted sole legal and physical custody in 2014. The mother was
not granted parenting time with those children. The fourth child, AM, lived
with the mother until May 15, 2016 when AM was found dead in her home. The
medical examiner performed an autopsy on the partially decomposed body and,
although unable to determine the exact cause of death, ruled the death a
homicide. The mother never reported the death. She was arrested, charged with
felony murder, second-degree murder, first and second-degree child abuse and
failure to report a dead body. As of September 14, 2017, she was awaiting trial
in Wayne County.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
DHHS filed a petition to terminate
the mother’s parental rights to her three children in Oakland Circuit Court,
which authorized the petition then ordered it transferred to Wayne County,
which refused to accept the case. The mother didn’t admit to the allegations in
the petition nor was a trial held, however, the trial court dismissed the
petition.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Oakland Circuit court’s reasoning
for dismissal was that it was impossible to establish jurisdiction since the
children, placed with their father, were safe; and, since it was unlikely that
the children would ever see their mother, assuming jurisdiction over them
wasn’t in the interests of judicial economy.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Analysis: <o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>DHHS, </b>in challenging the dismissal, argued that the fact that the children are safely placed with
their father didn’t detract from the danger the mother posed to the children if
they were ever to be returned to her care and does not prevent the trial court
from finding jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">The <b>mother</b> and the <b>children’s
lawyer-guardian ad-litem</b> (L-GAL) disagreed, arguing that,<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="line-height: 200%;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">because the children were safely in
the care of their father, they were not being neglected, had not been
abandoned, and were not at a substantial risk of harm to their mental well-being,
the trial court could not have possibly have jurisdiction pursuant to MCL
712A.2(b).</span><span style="font-family: times new roman, serif; font-size: 12pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The MCOA noted that the state may
exercise its authority to protect children by seeking an adjudication over one
or both parents as the circumstances warrant. And, the court noted, as found in
prior opinions and once jurisdiction over the children is established, may also
terminate the rights of one parent while the children are living safely with
another. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The MCOA reversed and remanded the
matter back to the trial court stating: “we find that the trial court clearly
erred by concluding that the children’s safe placement with their” father
barred its exercise of jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b). And, because the trial
court didn’t conduct an adjudication trial, the court couldn’t determine
whether jurisdiction would be appropriate.<o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The matter was appealed to the
Michigan Supreme Court which was denied.<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Oakland County, MI, USA42.592192399999988 -83.33618799999999341.844867399999984 -84.627081499999989 43.339517399999991 -82.0452945tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-57102970193912971782018-02-20T12:30:00.000-05:002018-02-20T13:33:22.401-05:00Alter-Ego Theory of Recovery - What is it and When is it Effective?<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In a case out of Oakland County, <b><i>Elkins
v Benner</i>, <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20171010_c331701_41_331701.opn.pdf">Nos 331701, 332664, 333114</a></b>, the plaintiff Elkins argued the <u>alter-ego
rule</u> to make the defendant Nancy Benner, spouse, responsible for her ex-husband/disbarred
attorneys’ failure to pay the agreed upon referral fee. The defendant filed a
motion for summary disposition.<span style="font-family: "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: 9.0pt; line-height: 200%;"> </span>In
addition to opposing defendant’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiff
filed a motion to amend his complaint to add or clarify claims and <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
to impose a constructive trust on
the proceeds of the sale of the defendant’s home. The Michigan Court of Appeals
disagreed with the alter-ego argument but upheld the arguments on conversion
and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Facts: </b>Plaintiff-Elkins, an attorney, alleges that defendant-Nancy’s
former husband, Brian Benner, failed to pay a referral fee ($169,000) for a
client that Elkins referred to Benner. Elkins’ theory was that Benner misappropriated
client funds, including funds for the attorney referral fee that Benner owed
plaintiff, and that defendant-Nancy acted in concert with Benner to defraud Elkins
through a sham divorce and property settlement, and that she was <i>unjustly enriched</i> by Benner’s misdeeds. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>The Alter-Ego Rule<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Elkin’s complaint alleges that
defendant-Nancy acted as Benner’s alter ego to misappropriate client funds and
shield those funds from creditors, and therefore, defendant could be held
personally liable for the attorney referral fee that Benner agreed to pay
plaintiff. The trial court agreed with her that Elkins
failed to state a “claim for alter ego because there’s no corporate entity
involved.”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The trial court refused to allow
plaintiff to amend his complaint to further clarify this claim because “there
is no such thing as alter ego, and you don’t plead any specificity as to that
anyways, as to the fraud you allege.” We agree with the trial court that there
is no basis in this situation for applying the alter-ego rule to allow the
imposition of liability on defendant for Benner’s alleged misdeeds<b>.<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The <b><u>alter-ego</u></b> theory allows a court to disregard a corporate
entity in order to impose liability on a person or a subservient corporation for
the corporation’s misdeeds. The theory allows a defendant who is the victim of
fraud, illegality or injustice to pierce the corporate veil to seek justice.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In this case, Elkins argues that
the rule can be extended to individuals. The lower court disagreed saying a
spousal relationship is not enough to hold one spouse liable for the illegal
acts of the other. There must be evidence of some legal relationship besides
the marriage for the rule to apply. The MCOA agreed and affirmed the lower
court’s denial of the Alter-ego claim.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Conversion<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Plaintiff Elkins argued that he had
a claim for statutory conversion (MCL600.2919a) because he had an intangible
property right to the referral fee, which Benner converted and defendant Nancy
aided that conversion.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
First, the court looked to the
Rules of Professional Conduct for guidance, concluding the rules and case law
support the reasoning that an action for conversion can be brought where one
attorney fails to turn over another attorney’s referral fee. Second, although
Benner can be held liable for converting the alleged referral fee, can Elkin’s
show a legal basis for imposing liability on Nancy, Benner’s ex-wife? <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The statute does allow liability be
placed on a party who knowingly receives converted property. The MCOA stated
that Elkins alleged enough facts to argue that Nancy knew and participated in a
scheme to convert client funds for personal use, therefore the matter was
remanded for further proceedings<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The trial court also denied
plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to add a claim under<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
the UFTA. Plaintiff’s proposed
amended complaint alleged that defendant and Benner conspired<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
to use their divorce property
settlement to facilitate the transfer of property from Benner to<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
defendant to shield the property
from Benner’s creditors, including plaintiff. The trial court<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
erred in ruling that plaintiff was
precluded from challenging the property settlement as an<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
improper transfer of marital assets
under the UFTA because such a challenge amounted to an<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
improper collateral attack on the
divorce judgment.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
While defendant argues that the
property transferred to her through the divorce is property held<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
as tenants by the entirety, and
therefore, cannot be the subject of any claim under the UFTA, the status of the
property was not addressed or decided below and cannot be ascertained on the
basis of the current record. Thus, the MCOA reasoned that it was not apparent
that any amendment to add a claim under the UFTA would be clearly futile. The
trial court did not identify any basis other than futility to deny plaintiff’s
motion to amend. Because the record fails to demonstrate that a claim under the
UFTA would be futile, the MCOA reversed the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s
motion to amend his complaint to add a claim under the UFTA.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Conclusion:</b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The MCOA affirmed in part and
reversed in part the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition and denying plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint,
vacated the trial court’s orders granting defendant’s motion for sanctions and
denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, and remanded for further proceedings. <o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Oakland County, MI, USA42.592192399999988 -83.33618799999999341.844867399999984 -84.627081499999989 43.339517399999991 -82.0452945tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-48646039303109034372018-02-13T10:30:00.000-05:002018-02-13T14:48:20.946-05:006th Circuit Orders Federal Government pay $450,000 in Attorney Fees to Defendant<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; text-indent: .5in;">
The US Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the Middle District of Tennessee’s
denial of defendant Circle C’s motion for attorney fees and sent the case back
for an award of legal fees and expenses related to the trial and appeal of the
government’s “excessive” damages demand. The case is <i>United States ex rel. Wall v Circle C Construction, LLC</i>, No. 16-6169 and is before the court for the
third time.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Facts: </b>Defendant, Circle C Construction, a family-owned general
contractor built 42 warehouses for the United States Army in Kentucky and
Tennessee. During the seven years of construction, a subcontractor, Phase Tech,
paid two of its electricians about $9,900 less than the wages mandated by the
Davis-Bacon Act. As a result, Circle C submitted a number of false “compliance
statements” to the government along with its invoices. The government thereafter
pursued Circle C for nearly a decade of litigation, demanding not merely
$9,900—Phase Tech paid $15,000 up front to settle that underpayment—but rather
$1.66 million, of which $554,000 was purportedly “actual damages” for the
$9,900 underpayment. The government's theory in support of that demand was that
all of Phase Tech's electrical work, in all of the warehouses, was “tainted” by
the $9,900 underpayment—and therefore worthless. “The problem with that
theory,” wrote the Court in the last appeal, was that, “in all of these
warehouses, the government turns on the lights every day.” <i>United States ex
rel. Wall v. Circle C Constr., LLC</i>, 813 F.3d 616, 617 (6th Cir. 2016). We
therefore reversed a $763,000 judgment in favor of the government and remanded
for entry of an award of $14,748—less than 1% of the government's demand.”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Analysis: </b>Following the reduction in damages, Circle C moved for
attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, which provides that if a
court awards damages to the government but the government’s original demand for
damages was both:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
</div>
<ul>
<li>Substantially in excess of the final judgment,
and</li>
<li>Unreasonable when compared with such judgment,
then,</li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 200%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The court must award the defendant
the fees and other expenses related to defending against the excessive demand.”
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(D). <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The Lower Court rejected Circle C’s
request leading to this appeal.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The Sixth Circuit was clear.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
It observed that the actual damage
to the government was $9,916 in underpayment to electricians and the government
faced “strong headwinds—both legal and common-sense—in asserting that its
demands” of roughly $554,000 in actual damages and $1.66 million overall, were
reasonable. The court noted that the warehouses built were functional and that
the government benefited from the work every minute of every day and,
therefore, the only damage consisted of the under-payment of two electricians,
which violated the minimum wage requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Second, the government warned that
a fee award in this case would have a “chilling effect” on its efforts “to
vigorously enforce” the False Claims Act. Gov't Br. at 13-14, 37. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The Court’s response: “One should
hope so. In this case the government made a demand for damages a hundredfold
greater than what it was entitled to, and then pressed that demand over nearly
a decade of litigation, all based on a theory that as applied here was nearly
frivolous. The consequences for Circle C included nearly a half-million dollars
in attorneys' fees. Section 2412(d)(1)(D) makes clear that the government must
bear its share of those consequences as well.”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
This ruling by the Sixth Circuit
suggests that the Equal Access to Justice Act may be of help to deter
unreasonable governmental damage requests in future False Claims Act cases.<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Ingham County, MI, USA42.6468943 -84.35420490000001342.2728663 -84.999651900000018 43.0209223 -83.708757900000009tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-38643332548550725812018-02-07T12:55:00.000-05:002018-02-07T13:02:18.447-05:00Divorcing Parties Cannot “Change Their Mind” About Mediation Agreement <div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">A defendant could not claim the mediation agreement he
signed during his divorce proceedings was unenforceable based on perceived
procedural mistakes when it was clear that he “simply regretted making the
agreement,” the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
</div>
<a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OuxrSIJNJQY/Wns9AhrZ4NI/AAAAAAAAAqI/VPg43WJ82vE9ZlbwPChw0z8PSRWCy55UQCLcBGAs/s1600/mediation.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="183" data-original-width="275" height="265" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OuxrSIJNJQY/Wns9AhrZ4NI/AAAAAAAAAqI/VPg43WJ82vE9ZlbwPChw0z8PSRWCy55UQCLcBGAs/s400/mediation.jpg" width="400" /></span></a><br />
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20180123_c338614_42_338614.opn.pdf"><i>Rettig v Rettig</i></a> (Docket No. 338614, issued 1/23/2018), the Court of Appeals reiterated something it has said in previous opinions:
parties cannot claim that an otherwise valid mediation agreement is unenforceable
just because they change their mind after signing it.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Here, the defendant had his attorney with him at the
time he signed the mediation agreement, the Court of Appeals explained, noting
the defendant “was aware of the provisions in the agreement that settled the
disputes over parenting time and custody, shown by his signature.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals held the trial court properly entered the order effectuating
the parties’ mediation agreement, and properly declined to grant the defendant’s
motion for reconsideration, rehearing and relief from judgment. The published opinion was authored by Judge Amy Ronayne
Krause, who was joined by Judge Jane E. Markey and Judge Joel P. Hoekstra.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Memorandum of
Understanding<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The plaintiff, Jamie Rettig, and the defendant, Jeffrey
Rettig, were married for five months and during that time had one minor child
together. The plaintiff also had another child from a previous relationship. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">During the parties’ divorce proceedings, the plaintiff
presented concerns about the defendant’s alleged lack of caretaking
interest or ability, alleged abuse of drugs and alcohol, and alleged violent
threats or outbursts. The plaintiff sought full physical custody of their child
with weekly supervised parenting time for the defendant. The defendant denied
the allegations regarding his behavior and requested joint legal and physical
custody. The Kent County Circuit Court entered a temporary order granting joint
legal custody with plaintiff having sole physical custody, granting defendant
parenting time of three times per week and ordering the defendant to pay $700 in
monthly child support.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The parties and
their attorneys subsequently participated in facilitated mediation. An
agreement was reached on all issues in the divorce, including that the
defendant would pay $300 in monthly child support and would be allowed additional
parenting time. The parties also agreed to review parenting time and custody
when the child reached certain ages. In addition, the memorandum appeared to resolve
any disputes over personal property and set forth the parties’ individual real
estate holdings. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The plaintiff and
the defendant ultimately signed a “memorandum of understanding” that reflected
their agreement, which concluded as follows: “This memorandum of understanding
spells out the agreement that we have reached in mediation. This resolves all
disputes between the parties and the parties agree to be bound by this
agreement.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">After a settlement
conference, the plaintiff filed a motion for entry of judgment on the
agreed-upon memorandum. However, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the
memorandum. The trial court held a hearing and entered a judgment of divorce,
finding that the defendant had signed the memorandum in the presence of his
attorney and his signature was expected to “mean something.” <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div align="center" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in; text-align: center;">
<b><span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">Parties ‘Mean What They Sign’<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The defendant appealed
the trial court’s decision, premising his argument on alleged procedural errors.
Essentially, the defendant claimed the memorandum was similar to a mediation
settlement and, therefore, certain procedures had to be followed under MCR
3.216(H)(7) and MCR 2.507(G). <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">However, the
defendant argued that proper procedures were not followed in this case because
the memorandum was not read into the court record and was not signed by the
mediator or the attorneys. The Court of Appeals disagreed and said, “[T]here was
a hearing held and the agreement was scrutinized before entered into the
proposed judgment. Thus, the agreement between the two parties was valid.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">According to the Court of Appeals, while a trial court does
not have to accept parties’ stipulations or agreements word-for-word, it can
accept them and presume “at face value” that the parties meant what they
signed. “There is no coherent reason presented why the trial court could
not do so in this case,” the Court of Appeals reasoned.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">Further, the defendant claimed the</span><span style="background: white; line-height: 200%;"> trial court had to make an independent factual
determination on the statutory best interest factors despite the mediation agreement.
In making this argument, the defendant cited </span><i><span style="line-height: 200%;">Rivette
v Rose-Molina</span></i><span style="line-height: 200%;">, 278 Mich App 327 (2008), and <i>Harvey v Harvey</i>, 470 Mich 186 (2004). But
the Court of Appeals found that neither <i>Rivette</i>
nor <i>Harvey</i> applied because the issue
in those cases was whether a trial court could “rubber stamp” a court referee’s
decision when divorcing parents disagree on custody and parenting-time. Thus, <i>Rivette</i> and <i>Harvey</i> “<span style="background: white;">involved the
exact opposite of an agreement reached by the parties,” the Court of Appeals observed.</span><o:p></o:p></span><span style="background: white; line-height: 200%;">The Court of Appeals continued by explaining that, while a trial court must
reach an independent conclusion that the divorcing parties’ agreement is in the
child’s best interests, the trial court is permitted to accept the parties’
agreement “where the dispute was resolved by the parents instead of a
stranger.”<i> </i>Applying this principle to
the present case, the Court of Appeals noted the trial court did not indicate
it believed that it was bound by the agreement but, instead, “correctly
expressed the belief that it was empowered to accept it.”</span><span style="background: white; line-height: 200%;">Lastly, the Court of Appeals addressed the defendant’s contention that
the trial court had to make a finding regarding the child’s established
custodial environment, in order to determine whether entry of the divorce
judgment would alter that environment. Calling the defendant’s argument in this
respect “nonsensical,” the Court of Appeals noted the context of such a
determination is one in which the trial court is making a custody determination
for the parties. Accordingly, </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">the requirement of making an express
determination of whether there is an established custodial environment “is as
inapposite to effectuating an agreement reached by the parties as is the
requirement of conducting intensive fact finding,” the Court stated.</span><span style="background: white; line-height: 200%;">In conclusion, the Court of Appeals said the trial court properly found
that the parties’ mediation agreement was in the best interests of the child
and correctly included it in its order. “[T]he </span><span style="line-height: 200%;">trial court was
not required to make a finding of an established custodial environment,
although of note, defendant actually received increased parenting time from the
prior arrangement as well as reduced support payments,” the Court of Appeals
wrote. “The evidence shows that there was no clear legal error or abuse of
discretion falling outside of the range of principled outcomes.”<br /><o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
<b><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background: white; line-height: 200%;">Blogger’s Note</span><span style="background: white; line-height: 200%;">:</span></span></b><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white;">It seems that this published decision is
inconsistent with prior case law and practice. It has long been understood
that, when faced with the parties’ settlement agreement on custody and
parenting time, that the trial court has to do some abbreviated review to
assure itself that the parties’ agreement is in the best interests of the
child. Certainly, there is unpublished case law on that point, See, e.g., </span><i>Vial v Flowers</i><span style="background-color: white;"> (Docket 332549, issued
Sept 27, 2016), and </span><i>Roguska v Roguska</i><span style="background-color: white;">
(Docket 291352, issued Sept 29, 2009). In addition, the Child Custody Act
allows parents to agree on joint custody, but even in that situation, the trial
court can refuse to grant joint custody if it finds there is clear and
convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the child’s best
interests. MCL 722.26a; see also </span><i>Koron
v Melendy</i><span style="background-color: white;">, 207 Mich App 188, 191 (1994). Were the trial courts allowed to
blindly accept the parties’ agreements on custody and parenting time, then
certainly the Child Custody Act would so indicate</span><span style="background-color: white; font-size: 12pt;">.</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Kent County, MI, USA43.0097027 -85.52002399999997842.2668562 -86.810917499999974 43.7525492 -84.229130499999982tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-21525210737789302472018-01-30T10:30:00.000-05:002018-01-31T13:16:48.966-05:00The Court of Appeals’ Discussion of Conservatorship Raises Questions<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In the case of <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170919_c332994_42_332994.opn.pdf"><i>In re Conservatorship of Rhea Brody</i>, No.
332994</a>, the Michigan Court of Appeals (MCOA), affirmed the lower court’s
appointment of a conservator over Rita Brody, an adult, under the Estates and
Protected Individuals Code (EPIC) MCL 700.5101 <i>et seq. </i>This is the second case concerning this family to be
challenged by Robert Brody, the first being <i>In
Re Rhea Brody Living Trust</i>, No.330871 in which Robert was removed as
trustee and Mary Lyneis appointed trustee.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Robert and his son, Jay Brody now
challenge the appointment of Lyneis as conservator of Rhea’s personal assets. While
agreeing with the court that Rhea is incompetent, he argues that the court
erred in concluding that Rhea “has property that will be wasted or dissipated
unless proper management is provided.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The court turned to Article V of
EPIC, providing for individuals under disability stating that “the court may
appoint a conservator…in relation to individual’s estate and affairs if the
court determines both” that the individual can’t manage property because of
mental illness and that the individual has property that will be wasted or
dissipated unless proper management is provided. These prerequisites must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The probate court considered Rhea's
circumstances and the nature of each of her personal assets—a Fifth Third bank
account for tax refunds, an individually-held IRA, a jointly-held Chase Bank
account, and jointly-owned homes in Michigan and Florida—before concluding that
the requirements of MCL 700.5401(3) had been met by clear and convincing
evidence. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Robert’s arguments of note:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: 200%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><b>1.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-weight: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span></b><!--[endif]-->It was <u>improper for the probate court to
consider joint assets</u> when evaluating the risk of waste or dissipation
because a conservator would be unable to change the nature of jointly-owned
property. <b><o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .5in;">
<b>The court:</b> Although case law precludes
a conservator from changing the nature of joint accounts after the
conservator's appointment, it does not limit a conservator's power to manage
the accounts or exclude joint assets from being considered at the
conservatorship hearing.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: 200%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->2.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->The probate court erred in appointing a
conservator to act on behalf of Rhea because Robert held a durable power of
attorney (DPOA) and was in a position to prevent waste and dissipation of
Rhea's estate. At the very least, according to Robert, he should have been
given priority over Lyneis as a potential conservator.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .5in;">
<b>The court: </b>The existence of a DPOA does
not prohibit the appointment of a conservator, and selection of an individual
to be appointed as an incapacitated person's conservator is a matter left to
the discretion of the probate court. The court noted that testimony
established that Robert didn’t handle matters using DPOA and was unduly
influenced by son, Jay, thus not competent to be conservator.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .5in;">
Under MCL
700.5409, a protected individual's spouse is entitled to consideration for
appointment as conservator, and is granted priority over all other individuals
except “[a] conservator, guardian of property, or <u>similar fiduciary
appointed or recognized by the appropriate court of another jurisdiction in
which the protected individual resides</u>,” MCL 700.5409(1)(a). <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .5in;">
As Rhea's husband,
Robert was entitled to priority consideration unless the probate court considered
an independent fiduciary and found him or her unsuitable. The court noted that Lyneis,
as trustee and independent fiduciary, had statutory priority over Robert,
despite Robert's marriage to Rhea. MCL 700.5409(1).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .5in;">
Question. In what
“appropriate court of another jurisdiction” was Lyneis appointed giving her
priority?<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="line-height: 200%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->3.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->The probate court’s appointment of a conservator
was an abuse of discretion since there was no evidence that any asset of the
estate had been wasted or dissipated.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .5in;">
<b>The court: </b>The Legislature's use of the
word “will” to modify “be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is
provided” in MCL 700.5401(3)(b) supports the probate court's decision to focus
on the likelihood that assets will be prospectively wasted or dissipated if a
conservator is not appointed.<br />
The MCOA, which
covered more issues than those presented, affirmed the lower court on all
points and found the Robert was unsuitable because Jay, the son, could
manipulate his father to the Rhea’s detriment.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: .5in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
</div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Oakland County, MI, USA42.592192399999988 -83.33618799999999341.844867399999984 -84.627081499999989 43.339517399999991 -82.0452945tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-19892819576025634232018-01-24T10:30:00.000-05:002018-01-24T12:31:32.128-05:00Michigan Supreme Court States New Process to Determine “proximate cause” under GTLA - Is it Clearer?<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The case of <i>Ray v Swager</i>, <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov:81/opinions/final/coa/20151015_c322766_28_322766.opn.pdf#search="ray v swager"">No: 322766</a>, came to the Michigan Court of Appeals
(MCOA) on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court. In the first appeal to the MCOA,
Eric Swager appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary
disposition. The MCOA reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded for
entry of summary disposition in Swager’s favor based on the conclusion that
reasonable minds could not conclude that Swager was “the proximate cause” of
plaintiff Ray’s injuries. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Ray appealed to the Michigan
Supreme Court, and the Michigan Supreme Court announced a new framework to
clarify the process for determining “the proximate cause” in the context of the
Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Facts:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
On September 2, 2011, 13-year-old
Ray, running with the Chelsea High School cross-country team, was struck by an
automobile driven by Scott Platt. Swager—the team’s coach—was running with the team. As the team
approached the intersection in question, they encountered a “red hand” on the
pedestrian signal, indicating that pedestrians should not cross the road. Although the eyewitness
accounts vary, there is evidence that Swager said something to effect of “let’s
go,” and the team crossed the street. Ray, who was in the back of the group,
ran into the road and was hit by Platt.<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-AETiplp-eTg/Wmi-OLtqvqI/AAAAAAAAAps/3c2dnsnqrFI5yum9RjP7bhtWaIOrpub7QCLcBGAs/s1600/do%2Bnot%2Bcross.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="720" data-original-width="1280" height="225" src="https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-AETiplp-eTg/Wmi-OLtqvqI/AAAAAAAAAps/3c2dnsnqrFI5yum9RjP7bhtWaIOrpub7QCLcBGAs/s400/do%2Bnot%2Bcross.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Procedural Background: <o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Following the accident, Ray filed
suit against Swager and Scott Platt. Swager answered with a motion for summary
disposition based on governmental immunity, arguing that, as a government
employee, he was immune because he wasn’t “grossly negligent” and his conduct
wasn’t the “proximate cause” of Ray’s injuries. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
When the MCOA reversed the decision
of the trial court and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of
Swager, it concluded that his remark ‘let’s go’ could not be considered the
proximate cause of Ray’s injuries since Ray ran in front of Platt’s car and
Platt hit him.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Supreme Court framework for analyzing ‘proximate cause’ under GTLA:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The analysis under this framework
begins by:<br />
<ol>
<li>Determining whether the defendant's gross
negligence was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries,</li>
<li>If his gross negligence is a factual cause, then
consider whether the defendant was a proximate or legal cause by addressing
foresee-ability, and</li>
<li>Whether the actor may be held legally
responsible for his or her conduct.</li>
</ol>
</div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 200%; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In addition to considering the
governmental actor’s conduct, it must also be decided whether there are other
proximate causes of the injury. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Determining if there are other proximate
causes of the injury requires consideration of whether any other human person
was negligent. The court stated: “only a human actor’s breach<b> </b>of a duty can be a proximate cause.” While
natural forces may bear on the question of foreseeability and intervening causes
when analyzing proximate<b> </b>cause, the
court indicated that they can never be considered the proximate cause of a
plaintiff’s injuries for the purposes of the GTLA. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Once all the proximate causes of
the injuries have been determined, then, taking all those causes into account,
the question is: was the government actor’s gross negligence the “proximate
cause” of the injury. In an effort to clarify this position the court stated: “The
relevant inquiry is not whether the defendant’s conduct was the immediate
factual cause of injury, but whether, weighing the legal responsibilities of
the actors involved, the government actor could be considered “the proximate
cause.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Using the analysis recommended by
the Michigan Supreme Court, the MCOA wrote that “Because issues of material
fact remain that preclude summary disposition, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of Swager’s motion for summary disposition and remand for further
proceedings.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Concurring Opinion:</b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Hon. Mark T. Boonstra, while
agreeing with the outcome of the majority, argued that the Supreme Court’s new method
of analysis is so confusing that “it may be that trial courts will throw up
their hands and simply allow everything to proceed to trial, even when
circumstances may not warrant.” Because of this, Judge Boonstra urged the
Legislature to state its intent, concluding that “…it is the Legislature that
can avoid further and prolonged judicial wrangling over legislative intent, and
further confusion in the trial courts, by restating its intent clearly and
explicitly and perhaps, as the [MSCt] Dissent suggests, without reference to
the much-maligned term, “proximate cause”.<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Washtenaw County, MI, USA42.3076493 -83.84730150000001541.9315518 -84.492748500000019 42.6837468 -83.20185450000001tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-4060468478405473522018-01-18T11:00:00.000-05:002018-01-26T15:11:56.381-05:00 Custody Dispute Ends Up in Eavesdropping Conviction<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Eavesdropping: </b><i>Any person who
is present or who is not present during a private conversation and who
willfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the conversation without the
consent of all parties thereto, or who knowingly aids, employs or procures
another person to do the same in violation of this section, is guilty of a
felony punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for not more than 2 years or
by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both. (MCL 750.539c)<o:p></o:p></i></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Kevin Clark and Erica Kosinski had
a child together. Their tumultuous relationship ended in a child custody
dispute. During that time, Clark found listening devices and GPS tracking
devices concealed in the child’s clothing during his parenting time. He found
what he described as some type of spy chip in the tongue of the child’s shoe,
which he took to the police who told him it was a sound activated recorder. The
sounds on the recorder were unintelligible and Erica denied any involvement so
the matter was dropped. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-BMgYB9nIBOM/WmEKkJlmsZI/AAAAAAAAApU/z0uPMekwLVQ-D157YCaHQHkCb3CHdjSMgCEwYBhgL/s1600/recorder%2Bin%2Bshirt.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" data-original-height="260" data-original-width="487" height="169" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-BMgYB9nIBOM/WmEKkJlmsZI/AAAAAAAAApU/z0uPMekwLVQ-D157YCaHQHkCb3CHdjSMgCEwYBhgL/s320/recorder%2Bin%2Bshirt.jpg" width="320" /></span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;">However, a month later Erica testified
in a family court parenting time hearing that, concerned Kevin was abusing the
child, she directed a tailor to put a recorder in her child’s jacket. That
information was given to the detective who re-opened the case and she was later
charged with eavesdropping. Following a jury trial, she was convicted. She appeals
the conviction in <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20171024_c332560_64_332560.opn.pdf">People v Kosinski,No.332560.</a></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The Michigan Court of Appeals
(MCOA) upheld the conviction in an unpublished opinion. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Kosinski raised several issues on
the appeal.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Sufficiency of the evidence</b>: <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> To
convict defendant of eavesdropping under MCL 750.539c the prosecution must
prove that defendant willfully used a device to eavesdrop upon a private
conversation without the consent of the parties to that conversation.
“Eavesdrop” or “eavesdropping” is defined as “to overhear, record or transmit
any of a private conversation without permission of all persons engaged in the
discourse. According to the Supreme Court, “private conversation means a
conversation that a person reasonably expects to be free from casual or hostile
intrusion or surveillance.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> Although
recognizing there were inconsistencies in the testimony regarding the recording
device, the defendant did admit to placing a recorder in the child’s jacket,
thus the court held that a “rational jury could reasonably infer that the
defendant placed a recorder on the child.”<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Defense of Duress</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b> </b>Kosinski contends
that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">duress deprived her of a fair
trial. Specifically, defendant claimed that her fear that Clark was<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">abusing the child during parenting
visits compelled her to place the recording device in the<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">child’s clothing in order to record
the abuse<b>.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b> Duress,</b> a
common-law affirmative defense, is established when there is threatening
conduct creating a fear of present, imminent bodily harm causing the defendant
to commit an act to avoid the threatened harm. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"> <span style="line-height: 200%;">The
MCOA upheld the lower court’s denial of the jury instruction stating “There is
no evidence to show how defendant’s act of concealing a recording device on the
child’s clothing during his visits with Clark could have directly prevented or
avoided any present, imminent, or impending abuse.”<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 200%;">Perjured
Testimony</span></b><span style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;"> Kosinski
claimed that Clark perjured himself during trial when he testified under<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;">oath that he did not enter a no
contest plea to poisoning the child during child protective<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;">proceeding involving the child,
rather, Clark testified that he pled to failure to protect th<span style="font-family: inherit;">e child </span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">while in the care of Kosinski. Kosinski
contended that this statement was false because the </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">transcript of the child protective
proceeding shows that Clark pled no contest to failure to protect </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the child based on his own conduct.</span></span></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;"> The
appellate court found no error stating “At the outset, defendant does not
explain how the prosecution knowingly presented the alleged false testimony,
nor is it clear from the record that the prosecution actually knew that Clark’s
testimony was false</span>.” <span style="line-height: 200%;">And, the court didn’t believe that the challenged
testimony affected the judgment of the jury.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 200%;">Admission
of prior testimony</span></b><span style="line-height: 200%;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="line-height: 200%;"> </span></b><span style="line-height: 200%;">Kosinski argued
that the trial court erred in allowing the admission of the prior testimony she
gave at the custody proceeding. She claimed that her prior testimony was
obtained in violation of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,
and thus, should not have been admitted in her criminal trial. The appellate
court disagreed.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;"> While
agreeing that her testimony during the prior custody hearing was incriminating,
the court noted that she was entitled to assert her Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination during the custody proceeding in regards to the questions
tending to incriminate her. Kosinski didn’t assert those rights at the hearing
and thus they were lost. Furthermore, because Kosinski was not testifying as a
criminal in the parenting time hearing, she was not entitled to advice
regarding the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;"> <b>Finally,</b> Kosinski argued ineffective
assistance of counsel and that her conviction should be reversed based on the
cumulative effect of the errors, which she said deprived her of a fair trial.
As to ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court, after reviewing her
complaints found that there was no ineffective assistance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="p1" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;"> The
MCOA explained their opinion on cumulative error as follows:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">“The cumulative effect of several
errors can constitute sufficient prejudice to warrant<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">reversal even when any one of the
errors alone would not merit reversal . . . .” <i>People v Dobek</i>, 274 Mich App 58, 106; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). However,
only actual errors are combined to determine the cumulative effect. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 292 n 64; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). Because we found that
there were no actual errors, defendant’s argument for reversal based on the
cumulative effect of the alleged errors necessarily fails.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The lower court opinion was
affirmed.</span><o:p></o:p></div>
</div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Wayne County, MI, USA42.2790746 -83.33618799999999341.9028961 -83.981635 42.6552531 -82.690740999999989tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-28748713399346258592018-01-15T12:00:00.000-05:002018-01-15T12:00:14.965-05:00In re Miller Minors<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-CA style='mso-ansi-language:EN-CA'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1</span><![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> The Michigan Court of Appeals issued the very first
decision (published or unpublished) under the Safe Delivery of Newborn Act
(SDNA), MCL 712.1 <i>et seq.</i>, which has existed since 2000. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Under
the SDNA, a parent can surrender a newborn to a hospital or emergency provider
within 3 days of birth and, after certain procedures are followed, the parental
rights of both surrendering parent and non-surrendering parent could be
terminated and child could be adopted. The SDNA was enacted to reduce the
number of newborns who were abandoned in dumpsters, public restrooms, and the
like, and as a way to save those babies’ lives and to help them achieve
permanency with a loving adoptive family. A majority of states have some form
of SDNA.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
<i><a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20180109_c338871_45_338871.opn.pdf">In re Miller Minors</a></i>, newborn twins were born at the hospital, where the
mother surrendered them. As permitted by the statute, the mother (Surrendering
Parent) did not identify the father. Pursuant to the statute, the hospital
social worker attempted to learn as much as she could about both the
surrendering parent and non-surrendering parent-again where the surrendering
parent is not required to give any information. The hospital contacted an
adoption agency, who placed the twins with prospective adoptive parents. </div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-z0fN9OVsPfU/Wlju1wIahGI/AAAAAAAAAoY/Q4AlR8NdRXkD6NERQUQo_KfD_oBt8jKVACLcBGAs/s1600/baby%2Bfeet.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="344" data-original-width="612" height="223" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-z0fN9OVsPfU/Wlju1wIahGI/AAAAAAAAAoY/Q4AlR8NdRXkD6NERQUQo_KfD_oBt8jKVACLcBGAs/s400/baby%2Bfeet.jpg" width="400" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Without
the name of the non-surrendering parent, the agency followed the statute and
published notice in a newspaper within 28 days of the surrender, in the county
where the twins were born. After 28 days of surrender and from notice, neither
the surrendering parent nor the non-surrendering parent came forward to claim
the children. Under the statute, the trial court must then terminate parental
rights of both surrendering and non-surrendering parent so the children can be
adopted. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
<i>Miller</i>, more than 3 months after the time period for the agency to
provide publication notice, the Department of Vital Records returned a birth
certificate that named a “father” for the children. Presumably, the Department
of Vital Records included that name because there was some record the
surrendering parent had married this person, although it is unclear how the
Department of Vital Records would have known if the couple had divorced in
another state, whether the man died in another state, and so on. Notably,
effective January 18, 2018, the Legislature amended the Vital Records Act so
that birth certificates issued for safe surrenders would only identify the
parents as “unknown” and the newborn as “Baby Doe.” The Vital Records Act was
amended to increase surrendering parents’ use of the SDNA without fear of their
name or the non-surrendering parents’ name appearing on the birth certificate–
the idea being that more surrendering parents would safely surrender and thus
save more lives.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
trial court in this case, however, concluded that the SDNA did not apply to
married parents because The Court of Appeals reversed and held that SDNA
applied to any kind of surrendering or non-surrendering parent, whether married
or not.<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Jackson, MI, USA42.245869 -84.40134619999997842.1518205 -84.562707699999976 42.3399175 -84.23998469999998tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-6490132339088088952018-01-09T14:30:00.000-05:002018-01-09T15:15:37.483-05:00Sufficiency of Plea in Juvenile Cases<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-CA style='mso-ansi-language:EN-CA'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1</span><![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> A defendant must understand their plea before it can
be entered in front of the court. With juveniles, MCR 3.941(C) says “the court
shall tell the juvenile: the possible dispositions.” At a very basic level this
means that the defendant must understand the consequences of what will come as
a result of their plea. Also MCR 3.941(C) states “the court may not accept a
plea of admission or of no contest without establishing support for a finding
that the juvenile committed the offense: either by questioning the or by other
means when the plea is a plea of admission.” Someone may not plea guilty to
something if they cannot admit to doing some acts that would meet the elements
of the crime they are being charged with. <i>In re Jackson</i>, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 29, 2017 (<a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170829_c331632_56_331632.opn.pdf">Docket No331632</a>). The defendant accepted a plea deal. The plea was for fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct, the defendant attempted to withdraw his plea because
he was not informed properly of the dispositions and also there was
insufficient facts to convict of CSC-IV. Slip op at 1. The trial court denied
the withdrawal, but the Court of Appeals remanded this case for further
proceedings to determine on the record whether the defendant actually had to
use force to overcome the victim, which would provide sufficient factual basis
for the plea. Slip op at 6.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-2fK6R1Ncjm8/WlUigTeZhpI/AAAAAAAAAn8/aY6IR-78zMIc0YM0Y24e7my3490NUxK4QCLcBGAs/s1600/Juveniles%2Bv%2BJustice.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="800" height="400" src="https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-2fK6R1Ncjm8/WlUigTeZhpI/AAAAAAAAAn8/aY6IR-78zMIc0YM0Y24e7my3490NUxK4QCLcBGAs/s400/Juveniles%2Bv%2BJustice.png" width="400" /></a></div>
The
defendant must be aware of the possible dispositions, or consequences, that may
be faced. MCR 3.941(C). The trial court will make the defendant aware of the
dispositions by informing him, on the record, the possible outcomes associated
with the plea. The trial court here informed the defendant very vaguely of the possibilities,
“If you plead guilty and support those facts I’ll send you to a group of
sociologists, psychologists, educational experts and others... They would test
you in a variety of different ways... [I]f there were problems that I could not
fix in the home then I’ll pull you out of the home.” Slip op at 3. Nonetheless,
the Court of Appeals determined this to be sufficient to inform the juvenile of
the consequences that could come as a result of this plea “we are not convinced
that the trial court’s decision to deny respondent’s motion to withdraw his
plea fell outside the range of principled outcomes.” Slip op at 3. Although
vague, the trial court had sufficiently explained the possible outcomes to the
juvenile. As for the “possible dispositions,” the Court of Appeals affirmed. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
factual basis that was provided on the record was not enough according to the
Court of Appeals. The factual basis must be able to be proven by all of the
elements. The fact that the contact element is proven is not sufficient to
provide a factual basis for the force or coercion element. “A factual basis to
support a plea can be established if an inculpatory inference could be drawn to
prove the underlying offense based on what respondent admits, even if an
exculpatory inference could also be drawn.” Slip op at 4. Just because someone
is touched does not mean that they were forced or coerced into that touching.
This is not an inference that can be made.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
A
court must protect the juveniles in such a way to make sure they have full
understanding of the consequences, and that also the juveniles know what must
be proven against them to convict on the charges. Juveniles generally do not
have the basic knowledge of the legal system, which would allow them to truly
understand what was happening. This makes the defense attorney and the judge
especially important in these cases. The Judge and defense attorney need to
make sure they take extra time allowing the defendant to fully understand
everything that is happening, the juvenile understands what they are agreeing
to, and why they are doing so. In a case like this when the court accepts the
plea without providing a sufficient factual basis on the record it allows the
juvenile to plea when there is the possibility that the factual basis is not
actually proven allowing the juvenile to admit to a crime they may not have
committed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-CA style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif;
mso-ansi-language:EN-CA'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1</span><![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-CA style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif;
mso-ansi-language:EN-CA'><span style='mso-element:field-end'></span></span><![endif]--><span style="font-family: "times new roman" , serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Wayne County, MI, USA42.2790746 -83.33618799999999341.9028961 -83.981635 42.6552531 -82.690740999999989tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-26737667809535022452018-01-04T11:00:00.000-05:002018-01-04T11:00:16.406-05:00Definition of “Removed” Controls Use of MIFPA Protections<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In the case of <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170822_c336348_67_336348.opn.pdf"><i>In re Detmer/Beaudry, Minor,</i> No.336348</a>, the two minor children, AB
and KD, and their mother are members of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
Indians (the Tribe) and thus, when AB was “removed” from his mother, the
special protections of the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA)<i> </i>applied. Because the trial court didn’t
comply with those protections, the Michigan Court of Appeals (MCOA) vacated the
court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-fg5OGnbGn5Y/Wkviikuf1SI/AAAAAAAAAng/HX4e5X7JPAQu7rtSnsB9OUWW0xtKZ73XgCLcBGAs/s1600/MIFPA.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="800" height="320" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-fg5OGnbGn5Y/Wkviikuf1SI/AAAAAAAAAng/HX4e5X7JPAQu7rtSnsB9OUWW0xtKZ73XgCLcBGAs/s320/MIFPA.png" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>FACTS:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
September 2016, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned
the trial court to remove the minor children from their mother’s care due to
the mother’s extensive history with Children’s Protective Services. At the
preliminary hearing, KD was voluntarily placed with her father, but AB remained
in the mother’s care. In November 2016, the trial court ordered that AB be
placed with the father due to concern for his safety with the mother. The court
declined to make any findings as to active efforts or risk of harm to AB since
he was not “out of the home of a parent.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
mother appealed arguing that the placement of AB and KD violated the
protections of MIFPA. When the matter came before the MCOA, the case below had
been settled and the children returned to their mother. All parties agreed that
the case was moot but asked the court to address the merits of the appeal
because the case involved an issue of <b>public
significance</b> <b>that is</b> <b>likely to</b> <b>recur, yet evade appellate review. </b>(<i>In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc.</i>,
420 Mich 148, 152 n 2; 362 NW2d 580 (1984).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>The Case is Moot but the Exception Against Deciding Moot Cases Applies:</b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
</div>
<ol>
<li>The question on appeal - whether a Native American
child has been “removed” from a parent - has paramount <i style="text-indent: -0.25in;">public significance</i><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">.</span></li>
<li>The issue is <i style="text-indent: -0.25in;">likely
to recur</i><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">. One of the problems identified by Congress and our Legislature
prior to enactment of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act and Michigan’s MIFPA
was that Native American children were being removed from their families and
tribes at alarmingly high rates.</span></li>
<li>Due to the nature of these cases, often
resolved before the MCOA can hear and review the issues, they <i style="text-indent: -0.25in;">evade appellate review.</i></li>
</ol>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>When is child “removed” from a parent calling for the procedural
protections of MIFPA to apply?<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Relying
on language in MCL 712B.15(2), the mother argues that the trial court erred
when it purportedly “removed” AB and KD without first making any findings as to
active efforts or risk-of-harm. DHHS responds that the trial court did not
“remove” either child and, accordingly, the provisions of MCL 712B.15(2) do not
apply. Thus, to resolve this matter, we need to construe the meaning of
“removed” under MIFPA. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
statute doesn’t define “removed.” After a review of other statutes, case law
and Black’s Law dictionary the court wrote, “Thus, we understand “removed” in
MCL 719B.15(2) to mean the instance when a court orders that a child be
physically transferred or moved from the care and residence of a parent or
custodian to the care and residence of some other person or institution.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Based
on this understanding, the MCOA stated, “it becomes clear that the trial court
erred with respect to AB. Over mother’s objection, the trial court ordered that
AB be physically placed with his father. AB had previously resided with his mother
and spent every other weekend with his father. The trial court’s order moved
AB’s residence to his father’s home and conditioned mother’s visitation on the
discretion of DHHS. Under our reading of MCL 712B.15(2), the trial court
“removed” AB from respondent-mother.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Because
AB was removed from a parent, the trial court was required under MIFPA to make
findings on whether active efforts were made to provide remedial services,
whether those efforts were successful, and whether respondent-mother’s
continued custody of AB posed a risk of emotional or physical harm to the
child. MCL 712B.15(2). The trial court was required to hear testimony of a
qualified expert witness concerning these matters. MCL 712B.15(2). The trial
court made no such findings and heard no such testimony, and this was
reversible error.”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
trial court didn’t err with regard to KD since the placement was voluntary and
not intended to be permanent. This is not “removal” but simply a mother making
decisions regarding her child.<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Kent County, MI, USA43.0097027 -85.52002399999997843.0097027 -85.520023999999978 43.0097027 -85.520023999999978tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-90143215008299488202018-01-02T14:30:00.001-05:002018-01-02T14:30:50.847-05:00When are Trust Assets Countable for Medicaid Eligibility?<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In three consolidated cases, <i>Hegadorn v DHHS</i>, <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170601_c329508_63_329508.opn.pdf">No. 329508</a>, the court
looked at the individual funding of long-term care under Medicaid deciding that
assets placed by an institutionalized individual’s spouse into a “Solely for
the Benefit of” Trust (“SBO Trust”) are countable assets for determining
whether the institutionalized individual is eligible for Medicaid benefits.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b>FACTS:</b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
facts in each case are identical. Mary Ann Hegadorn, Dorothy Lollar and Roselyn
Ford began receiving long-term care at nursing homes. Within a short time after
receiving care, their spouses established “Solely for the Benefit” (SBO)
trusts. After the trusts were established, the women applied for Medicaid
benefits. The Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) denied
their applications determining that each had countable assets, including those
placed in the SBO trusts, exceeding the applicable Medicaid benefits
eligibility. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Each
appealed to an Administrative Law Judge and in each case, the ALJ affirmed the
Departments initial asset assessment that because the assets of the parties
were in existence when the women entered long-term care, they must be counted
in determining eligibility.</div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-56XCSNhHNdk/Wkvdq4XfiXI/AAAAAAAAAnQ/Yi8WCFFOOJsPlZXQR6pxQlnPRYBJo5HZwCLcBGAs/s1600/medicaid.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="513" data-original-width="770" height="212" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-56XCSNhHNdk/Wkvdq4XfiXI/AAAAAAAAAnQ/Yi8WCFFOOJsPlZXQR6pxQlnPRYBJo5HZwCLcBGAs/s320/medicaid.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In
each case, the plaintiffs appealed the ALJ’s decision to the circuit court. Livingston
Circuit Judge Michael P. Hatty reversed the ALJ's decisions to affirm the
Department’s denial of Mrs. Hegadorn’s and Mrs. Lollar’s applications. Judge Hatty
explained that as of the date of the filing of the request for benefits, the
assets placed in an SBO trust were not countable to the institutionalized
spouse. Later, the Department made a change in policy which would include the
assets, adversely affecting the parties. Relying on <i>Hughes v McCarthy</i>, 734 F.3d 473 at 480, he set aside the order of
the ALJ on both files. Washtenaw Circuit Judge Timothy P. Connors, relying on
Judge Hatty’s reasoning also reversed the ALJ’s decision in the third case.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
MCOA concluded that the circuit courts did not apply the correct legal
principles in these appeals, reversing the circuit court’s orders and
reinstating the decisions reached by the ALJs.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b>ANALYSIS:</b><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
According
to the MCOA, each trust at issue in this case was a Medicaid trust. Using the
guidance of Bridges Eligibility Manual which stated that the amount of the
principal of a trust that is a countable asset depends on the terms of the
trust. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Thus,
the issue before the court is whether “there is any condition under which the
principal could be paid to or on behalf of the institutionalized person from an
irrevocable trust.” <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
After
reviewing the sections of each trust title “Distribution of Assets,” the court
concluded that the trust assets placed into each trust shortly before the
Medicaid applications were filed are to be “use[d] up” during the husbands’
lifetimes. Similarly, all three trusts included language that instructs the
trustees to distribute the assets “on an actuarially sound basis,” which means
that the “spending must be at a rate that will use up all the resources during
the party’s lifetime.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Thus,
the court concluded, because there was a “condition under which the principal
could be paid to or on behalf of the person from an irrevocable trust,” the
assets in the trusts were properly determined to be countable assets by the
Department.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; mso-outline-level: 1;">
<b>The MCOA disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument
re: the following:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<u>The
Department didn’t impermissibly change its policy</u>—the change was a
clarification of the way it had treated SBO trust assets for
Medicaid-eligibility purposes, explaining that the change was required in order
to comply with federal mandates, but that is not a change in law or policy. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<u>Retroactive
application</u>---plaintiffs argue that the change was inapplicable to them
because the change cannot be retroactively applied. The court disagreed. <b>First</b>, there could be severe
consequences statutorily imposed on the Department should it choose not to
comply with the federal requirements. <b>Second,</b>
the plaintiffs and amicus do not cite, and we are unable to find, any authority
to support the proposition that individuals who are not entitled to Medicaid
benefits should nevertheless receive them based on an alleged change in
interpretation of applicable state and federal authority. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
After
a review of federal statutes and related administrative manuals, the court
concluded that the clear legislative language that Congress intended that when
making an initial eligibility determination, states are to consider assets held
by the institutionalized spouses—in this case, the plaintiffs—and the community
spouses—in this case, the plaintiffs’ husbands.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Accordingly,
the court held the assets were countable and reversed the circuit courts’
orders providing otherwise and reinstate the decisions reached by the ALJs.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Keep
watching—this matter has been appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. We’ll
keep you posted.<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Livingston County, MI, USA42.6207951 -83.84730150000001542.246793100000005 -84.492748500000019 42.9947971 -83.20185450000001tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-34295861731632351692017-12-28T11:30:00.000-05:002017-12-28T11:30:25.630-05:00Medical Marihuana Meets Child Welfare and Termination of Parental Rights<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
In the matter of <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170912_c337095_47_337095.opn.pdf"><i>In re</i> <i>B. Hadd, Minor</i>, No: 337095</a>,
<a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170912_c337095_47_337095.opn.pdf">337097</a>, the termination of parental rights of both parents by the lower court
was upheld by the Michigan Court of Appeals (MCOA). The application of the MCOA
order is being held in abeyance pursuant to the order of the Michigan Supreme
Court, SC: 156604 because the Court believes the decision in the case of <i>In re Hill, Minors</i> (No.155152) presently
before it may resolve a similar issue raised in the <i>Hadd</i> application for leave to appeal. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Facts:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The trial
court found that grounds for terminating respondents’
parental rights were established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g),
(j), and (l). The <b>respondent-mother</b> had
not addressed her substance abuse issues during the 24 months the child was
under the court’s jurisdiction; nor did she seek help for her mental health
issues. The evidence provided, concluded the MCOA, was sufficient to find the
grounds for terminating her rights under Sec. 19b(3)(g) and (j).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The <b>respondent-father</b>
argued that by terminating his parental rights to his child, the trial court
violated his rights under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA), MCL
333.26371 et seq. Citing MCL 333.26424(a), he contends that he could not be
denied custody or have his parental rights terminated because of his continued
medical use of marijuana. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Medical Marihuana use and parental rights</b>.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
A parent’s right to custody or visitation when the parent
holds a valid medical-marijuana card is addressed in MCL 333.26424(d), which
provides: <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
“A person shall not be denied custody or visitation of a
minor for acting, in accordance with this act, unless the person’s behavior is
such that it creates an unreasonable danger to the minor that can be clearly
articulated and substantiated.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The MCOA rejected the
father’s reliance on the statute for two reasons:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpFirst" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 31.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->1.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->He is not currently entitled to claim
protection under the MMMA because his medical-marijuana registry card expired
in February 2016. Respondent-father never presented any evidence that his card
was renewed or that he continued to have a medical need for marijuana. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraphCxSpLast" style="line-height: 200%; margin-left: 31.5pt; mso-add-space: auto; mso-list: l0 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]-->2.<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; line-height: normal;">
</span><!--[endif]-->Second, the record does not indicate
that the trial court denied respondent-father custody or terminated his
parental rights because he obtained a medical-marijuana card or because of his
actions in accordance with the MMMA. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
According to the trial court, his rights were terminated
because of his failure to cooperate with the terms of his treatment plan,
failure to explore alternative treatment options as recommended in his
psychological evaluation and his failure to present evidence of his condition
justifying a medical need for marijuana or that marijuana was a recommended
treatment for it. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The MCOA reviewed the best interests’ standard and found
that the termination of both parents’ rights was in the best interests of the
child. Both parents were non-compliant with treatment plans. The father
contends that apart from his marijuana use, there was no evidence of neglect—noting
that his supervised visits were appropriate. However, he never made the effort
to progress beyond supervised visitation.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The matter is now before the Supreme Court awaiting the
decision in <i>In re Hill,</i> <i>Minors, </i>which involves the issue of
whether the collateral attack rule bars a challenge to the lower court initial
exercise of jurisdiction. The same issue was raised by the father in<i> Hadd</i> arguing that the trial court
violated MCR 3.971(B)(4) by failing to advise him at the time of his plea that
the plea could be used as evidence in a later proceeding to terminate his
parental rights. <o:p></o:p></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
We will keep you advised of the Supreme Court’s decision
on that issue.<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-9527334178862282902017-12-22T16:25:00.002-05:002017-12-22T16:27:43.317-05:00It Pays to Check Your Math<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Charging Lien:</b> Discharged attorneys may obtain a charging lien,
which “is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due for services
secured out of the judgment or recovery in a particular suit<i>.” George v Sandor M Gelman</i>, PC, 201
Mich App 474 (1993).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The Michigan Court of Appeals
(MCOA) affirmed the lower court’s decision reducing the amount of an attorney’s
<u>charging lien</u> in <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170914_c330728_78_330728.opn.pdf">RivertownDevelopment Group v West Congress Street Partners, No. 330728.</a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Facts:<o:p></o:p></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Petitioner Lawrence Walker was
retained in May 2014 as counsel for West Congress Street Partners in a
litigious landlord-tenant dispute. The relationship broke down, a new lawyer
was hired and Walker was allowed to resign as counsel by court order dated
March 11, 2015. A two-day hearing was held to determine the accuracy of
Walker’s $35,094 charging lien on the settlement in April 2015. Following the hearing,
the court determined the amount owed to be $18,889.62 calculated as follows:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
167 hours @
$300 = $50,100.00<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Expenses
2,833.62<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<u>Payments (34,044.00)<o:p></o:p></u></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Balance
due $18,889.62<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Walker, on his appeal, claimed the
court abused its discretion by (1) making a math error when it found that West
Congress made prior payments of $34,044 when the actual amount was $30,155, 2)
reducing the billable hours from 217 to 167.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Analysis: </b>The MCOA affirmed the lower court
on both counts.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Math error: </b>While it may be true that the math was in error and the
correct amount of payments was $30,155, the error was not raised during the
two-day hearing and the parties accepted the $34,000 figures as accurate. “It
is not the trial court’s burden to check petitioner’s math when the
petitioner’s own documentation clearly stated that payments on the account
totaled $34,044.14.”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Hour Reduction: </b>Courts calculate attorney fees by first determining
the reasonable hourly rate customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, then multiply by the reasonable number of hours expended. The MCOA
supported the reduction in hours stating: “…the trial court explicitly stated
that its decision was based on the parties’ testimony, petitioner’s billing
statement, and the court’s knowledge of billing in general.” After the 2-day hearing,
MCOA stated that “the trial court was in the best position to determine the
reasonable hours expended by petitioner, which it did.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The court “did not abuse its
discretion by not crediting petitioner with all of the hours listed in the
billing statement” and the Michigan Supreme Court said that in determining the
number of reasonable hours, trial courts should “exclude excessive, redundant
or otherwise unnecessary hours regardless of the attorneys’ skill, reputation
or experience.”<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
Thus, the MCOA concluded that the
trial court’s determination Walker reasonably expended 167 hours rather than
the 217 billed on defendant’s case fell within “the range of principled
outcomes.”</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<b>Lessons to be learned:</b> Check your math more than once and be
prepared to defend your hours when requesting enforcement of a charging lien or
payment of your bill in court. <o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-30412386902324783932017-12-05T14:35:00.000-05:002017-12-05T14:42:01.135-05:00COA Examines Need for Evidentiary Hearing in Child Threshold Case<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 200%;"> </span> Change in circumstances often lead
to a motion to change custody. In <i>D’itri v Bollinger</i>, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, Docket <a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/opinions/final/coa/20170919_c337815_27_337815.opn.pdf">337815</a> (2017), the mother of the
child filed a motion to change custody claiming there was a change in
circumstances in the child’s living situation. Slip op at 2. The father’s wife
passed away, and the mother claimed the father stopped allowing the child to
partake in her extra-curricular activities, did not provide healthy meals, and
did not provide a clean home. The child also felt a loss of emotional
connection with her father after the step-mother’s death, including frequently
eating dinner alone in her room and the child texting the mother that she
wanted to see a therapist and was “going insane.” The father acknowledged that
the death of his wife had been a difficult adjustment for him, but denied this
was grounds to change custody. A conciliator conference was held to determine
if it was proper to revisit custody, and the conciliator recommended a change
in custody. The lawyer guardian at litem also recommended a change of custody.
The trial court denied the mother’s motion without an evidentiary hearing and
stated she did not have proper cause.</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%; margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin-bottom: 0in; mso-layout-grid-align: none; text-autospace: none;">
<span style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 200%;"> On appeal, the Court of Appeals
noted there are only two scenarios where an evidentiary</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-r3U4vsLYqH8/Wib00HrTZmI/AAAAAAAAAm0/-ZuPTF1OZyoqMAZcawuShpo634vevtkyACEwYBhgL/s1600/child-custody.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="400" data-original-width="600" height="213" src="https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-r3U4vsLYqH8/Wib00HrTZmI/AAAAAAAAAm0/-ZuPTF1OZyoqMAZcawuShpo634vevtkyACEwYBhgL/s320/child-custody.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
hearing is not
necessary for the Threshold Question: when the facts are not disputed and when
the alleged facts would not establish proper cause. The trial court did not
hold an evidentiary hearing even after the recommendation of the conciliator
and lawyer guardian at litem found that the facts would require a change of
custody. The trial court should have determined whether an evidentiary hearing
was necessary, which it did not do. The Court of Appeals determined that the
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the threshold question when the facts
were disputed was clear legal error. The facts alleged in the motion, if true,
would constitute proper cause or change in circumstances.</div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Ingham County, MI, USA42.6468943 -84.35420490000001342.2728663 -84.999651900000018 43.0209223 -83.708757900000009tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4598945826874384930.post-19301842131104094152017-11-20T16:05:00.000-05:002017-11-21T15:14:56.408-05:00Court of Appeals Hold that Adoption is Moot After Order of Filiation Entered<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<!--[if supportFields]><span
lang=EN-CA style='mso-ansi-language:EN-CA'><span style='mso-element:field-begin'></span><span
style='mso-spacerun:yes'> </span>SEQ CHAPTER \h \r 1</span><![endif]--><!--[if supportFields]><span
style='mso-element:field-end'></span><![endif]--> In <i>In re LMB </i>(<a href="http://publicdocs.courts.mi.gov/OPINIONS/FINAL/COA/20170914_C338169_48_338169.OPN.PDF">Docket No. 338169</a>), the Court of
Appeals held that entry of an order of filiation while an adoption appeal was
pending mooted the adoption appeal. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
The
adoption case involved a putative father who had undisputedly neither provided
any support to the child or the birth mother, nor had any custodial
relationship with the child. The adoption trial court refused to terminate the
putative father’s rights to the child, but its own opinion was highly critical
of the putative father. The prospective adoptive parents appealed the decision
of the trial court, questioning both the trial court’s choice of standard of
proof, and whether custody with the putative father was truly in the child’s
best interests given the copious evidence of immaturity, irresponsibility, and
instability.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-o5xM43xRi4M/WhNC7fdLpiI/AAAAAAAAAmU/hE8YQG2Hp-wSbmmFw8CeODn1a9cOJl3OgCLcBGAs/s1600/aditya-romansa-117344.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1200" data-original-width="1600" height="240" src="https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-o5xM43xRi4M/WhNC7fdLpiI/AAAAAAAAAmU/hE8YQG2Hp-wSbmmFw8CeODn1a9cOJl3OgCLcBGAs/s320/aditya-romansa-117344.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
After
the Section 39 hearing under the Adoption Code had begun, the putative father
filed a paternity action. While the adoption appeal was pending, the paternity
trial court entered an order of filiation making the putative father the legal
father of the child. The prospective adoptive parents attempted to stay the
paternity case and prevent entry of an order of filiation prior to resolution
of their adoption appeal, but the paternity trial court refused to stay the case, and
the Court of Appeals dismissed the adoption appeal as moot.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
<i>In
re LMB</i> brings to light important issues with respect to the interplay of
the Paternity Act and the Adoption Code. The Court of Appeals’ decision, with
no concurrent policy that paternity courts stay their proceedings pending
adoption matters, creates real problems in the area of adoption law. The
ability to moot an adoption appeal simply by obtaining a DNA test and an order
of filiation effectively eliminates the ability of prospective adoptive parents
or birth mothers to appeal any adoption case denying termination of parental
rights, which eliminates appellate review of any adoption decision favoring a
putative father. The ability to actively prevent appellate review through a
concurrent paternity proceeding will lead to poor and inconsistent application
of the law and unpredictability for prospective adoptive parents in any case in
which a putative father may emerge seeking the child.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 200%;">
An
application for leave to appeal is now pending in the Michigan Supreme Court in
<i>LMB</i>, as well as an application to the Court of Appeals of the related
paternity case—in the hopes of obtaining a decision that will preserve
prospective adoptive parents’ right to appeal and adoptees’ rights to a
placement based on their best interests.<o:p></o:p></div>
Liisa Speakerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06928954885989264294noreply@blogger.com0Wayne County, MI, USA42.2790746 -83.33618799999999341.9028961 -83.981635 42.6552531 -82.690740999999989