Discrimination based on a person’s
transgender status is discrimination based on sex and is prohibited under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
ruled.
The decision in EEOC
v R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. reinstated a funeral director’s
transgender bias claim against the Michigan funeral home that had fired her.
In its ruling, the 6th Circuit rejected the
funeral home’s argument that it was protected by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The funeral home’s owner claimed
that employing the director, who was biologically male but was transitioning to
female, went against his Christian beliefs.
The decision comes on the heels of two rulings out
of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Both of those decisions held that discrimination
based on sexual orientation is prohibited under Title VII.
Fired Funeral Director
Aimee Stephens, a funeral director at
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, was
born male. She was fired from her job after informing the funeral home’s owner
that she intended to transition from male to female and intended to present as
a female at work.
After being discharged, Stephens filed a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), asserting discrimination
based on sexual orientation. The EEOC investigated and filed suit against the
funeral home in the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII. The funeral home filed a motion to
dismiss the EEOC’s lawsuit, arguing there was no valid sex discrimination claim.
The funeral home maintained the RFRA precluded the enforcement of Title VII because
doing so would “substantially burden” the funeral home owner’s exercise of his religious
beliefs.
The Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the EEOC’s complaint, holding that transgender
status is not a protected trait under Title VII and that the EEOC could not
file a discrimination claim based solely on the plaintiff’s transgender and/or
transitioning status. In so ruling, the Eastern District accepted the funeral
home’s argument that the RFRA applied.
On appeal, the 6th Circuit reversed. According to the
Court, the Eastern District improperly held that a claim cannot be pursued under
Title VII based on transgender/transitioning status.
“Stereotypical Notions”
In its decision, the 6th Circuit explained that sexual
stereotyping and transgender discrimination are “based on the non-conformance
of an individual’s gender identity and appearance with sex-based norms or
expectations.” As a result, discrimination because of an individual’s
transgender status “is always based on gender stereotypes: the stereotype that
individuals will conform their appearance and behavior – whether their dress,
the name they use, or other ways they present themselves – to the sex assigned
them at birth,” the Court said.
According
to the 6th Circuit, “it is analytically impossible to fire an employee based on
that employee’s status as a transgender person without being motivated, at
least in part, by the employee’s sex.” The Court explained that an employer
cannot discriminate based on transgender status without imposing its
stereotypical notions of how “sexual organs and gender identity ought to align”
and there is “no way to disaggregate discrimination on the basis of transgender
status from discrimination on the basis of gender non-conformity.”
Rejecting
the funeral home’s claim that the RFRA precluded enforcement of Title VII, the
6th Circuit pointed out the RFRA prohibits the government from “substantially
burdening” a person’s exercise of religion, unless the government demonstrates
the burden is:
- in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and
- the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
In
this case, the 6th Circuit said the funeral home’s argument that the “burden” in
connection with Stephens presenting as female – namely that it (1) would be a
“distraction” for the deceased’s family members and (2) would force the funeral
home to violate the owner’s faith – was not “substantial” within the meaning of
RFRA.
Addressing
the “distraction” argument, the 6th Circuit said a religious claimant “cannot
rely on customers’ presumed biases to establish a substantial burden under
RFRA.” Regarding the “faith” argument, the Court explained that allowing Stephens
to wear attire that reflects a conception of gender that is at odds with the
owner’s religious beliefs was not a substantial burden because “tolerating
Stephens’ understanding of her sex and gender identity is not tantamount to
supporting it.” The Court added, “[T]he fact that [the funeral home owner]
sincerely believes that he is being compelled to make such an endorsement does
not make it so.”
In
conclusion, the 6th Circuit noted that even if a substantial burden was involved,
enforcing Title VII was the least restrictive means of furthering the
compelling interest of preventing workplace discrimination. “Where the
government has developed a comprehensive scheme to effectuate its goal of
eradicating discrimination based on sex, including sex stereotypes, it makes
sense that the only way to achieve the scheme’s objectives is through its
enforcement,” the Court wrote.
Labels: Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Sex Discrimination, Title VII, Transgender Discrimination, U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals