A defendant could not claim the mediation agreement he
signed during his divorce proceedings was unenforceable based on perceived
procedural mistakes when it was clear that he “simply regretted making the
agreement,” the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled.
In Rettig v Rettig (Docket No. 338614, issued 1/23/2018), the Court of Appeals reiterated something it has said in previous opinions:
parties cannot claim that an otherwise valid mediation agreement is unenforceable
just because they change their mind after signing it.
Here, the defendant had his attorney with him at the
time he signed the mediation agreement, the Court of Appeals explained, noting
the defendant “was aware of the provisions in the agreement that settled the
disputes over parenting time and custody, shown by his signature.”
Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals held the trial court properly entered the order effectuating
the parties’ mediation agreement, and properly declined to grant the defendant’s
motion for reconsideration, rehearing and relief from judgment. The published opinion was authored by Judge Amy Ronayne
Krause, who was joined by Judge Jane E. Markey and Judge Joel P. Hoekstra.
Memorandum of
Understanding
The plaintiff, Jamie Rettig, and the defendant, Jeffrey
Rettig, were married for five months and during that time had one minor child
together. The plaintiff also had another child from a previous relationship.
During the parties’ divorce proceedings, the plaintiff
presented concerns about the defendant’s alleged lack of caretaking
interest or ability, alleged abuse of drugs and alcohol, and alleged violent
threats or outbursts. The plaintiff sought full physical custody of their child
with weekly supervised parenting time for the defendant. The defendant denied
the allegations regarding his behavior and requested joint legal and physical
custody. The Kent County Circuit Court entered a temporary order granting joint
legal custody with plaintiff having sole physical custody, granting defendant
parenting time of three times per week and ordering the defendant to pay $700 in
monthly child support.
The parties and
their attorneys subsequently participated in facilitated mediation. An
agreement was reached on all issues in the divorce, including that the
defendant would pay $300 in monthly child support and would be allowed additional
parenting time. The parties also agreed to review parenting time and custody
when the child reached certain ages. In addition, the memorandum appeared to resolve
any disputes over personal property and set forth the parties’ individual real
estate holdings.
The plaintiff and
the defendant ultimately signed a “memorandum of understanding” that reflected
their agreement, which concluded as follows: “This memorandum of understanding
spells out the agreement that we have reached in mediation. This resolves all
disputes between the parties and the parties agree to be bound by this
agreement.”
After a settlement
conference, the plaintiff filed a motion for entry of judgment on the
agreed-upon memorandum. However, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the
memorandum. The trial court held a hearing and entered a judgment of divorce,
finding that the defendant had signed the memorandum in the presence of his
attorney and his signature was expected to “mean something.”
Parties ‘Mean What They Sign’
The defendant appealed
the trial court’s decision, premising his argument on alleged procedural errors.
Essentially, the defendant claimed the memorandum was similar to a mediation
settlement and, therefore, certain procedures had to be followed under MCR
3.216(H)(7) and MCR 2.507(G).
However, the
defendant argued that proper procedures were not followed in this case because
the memorandum was not read into the court record and was not signed by the
mediator or the attorneys. The Court of Appeals disagreed and said, “[T]here was
a hearing held and the agreement was scrutinized before entered into the
proposed judgment. Thus, the agreement between the two parties was valid.”
According to the Court of Appeals, while a trial court does
not have to accept parties’ stipulations or agreements word-for-word, it can
accept them and presume “at face value” that the parties meant what they
signed. “There is no coherent reason presented why the trial court could
not do so in this case,” the Court of Appeals reasoned.
Further, the defendant claimed the trial court had to make an independent factual
determination on the statutory best interest factors despite the mediation agreement.
In making this argument, the defendant cited Rivette
v Rose-Molina, 278 Mich App 327 (2008), and Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186 (2004). But
the Court of Appeals found that neither Rivette
nor Harvey applied because the issue
in those cases was whether a trial court could “rubber stamp” a court referee’s
decision when divorcing parents disagree on custody and parenting-time. Thus, Rivette and Harvey “involved the
exact opposite of an agreement reached by the parties,” the Court of Appeals observed.
Blogger’s Note:
It seems that this published decision is inconsistent with prior case law and practice. It has long been understood that, when faced with the parties’ settlement agreement on custody and parenting time, that the trial court has to do some abbreviated review to assure itself that the parties’ agreement is in the best interests of the child. Certainly, there is unpublished case law on that point, See, e.g., Vial v Flowers (Docket 332549, issued Sept 27, 2016), and Roguska v Roguska (Docket 291352, issued Sept 29, 2009). In addition, the Child Custody Act allows parents to agree on joint custody, but even in that situation, the trial court can refuse to grant joint custody if it finds there is clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the child’s best interests. MCL 722.26a; see also Koron v Melendy, 207 Mich App 188, 191 (1994). Were the trial courts allowed to blindly accept the parties’ agreements on custody and parenting time, then certainly the Child Custody Act would so indicate.
Blogger’s Note:
It seems that this published decision is inconsistent with prior case law and practice. It has long been understood that, when faced with the parties’ settlement agreement on custody and parenting time, that the trial court has to do some abbreviated review to assure itself that the parties’ agreement is in the best interests of the child. Certainly, there is unpublished case law on that point, See, e.g., Vial v Flowers (Docket 332549, issued Sept 27, 2016), and Roguska v Roguska (Docket 291352, issued Sept 29, 2009). In addition, the Child Custody Act allows parents to agree on joint custody, but even in that situation, the trial court can refuse to grant joint custody if it finds there is clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in the child’s best interests. MCL 722.26a; see also Koron v Melendy, 207 Mich App 188, 191 (1994). Were the trial courts allowed to blindly accept the parties’ agreements on custody and parenting time, then certainly the Child Custody Act would so indicate.
Labels: Child custody, divorce judgement, divorce mediation, MCR 2.507, MCR 3.216, mediation agreement, memorandum of understanding. MCL 722.26q, parenting time, statutory best interest factors
