The case of Ray v Swager, No: 322766, came to the Michigan Court of Appeals
(MCOA) on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court. In the first appeal to the MCOA,
Eric Swager appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary
disposition. The MCOA reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded for
entry of summary disposition in Swager’s favor based on the conclusion that
reasonable minds could not conclude that Swager was “the proximate cause” of
plaintiff Ray’s injuries.
Ray appealed to the Michigan
Supreme Court, and the Michigan Supreme Court announced a new framework to
clarify the process for determining “the proximate cause” in the context of the
Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA).
Facts:
On September 2, 2011, 13-year-old
Ray, running with the Chelsea High School cross-country team, was struck by an
automobile driven by Scott Platt. Swager—the team’s coach—was running with the team. As the team
approached the intersection in question, they encountered a “red hand” on the
pedestrian signal, indicating that pedestrians should not cross the road. Although the eyewitness
accounts vary, there is evidence that Swager said something to effect of “let’s
go,” and the team crossed the street. Ray, who was in the back of the group,
ran into the road and was hit by Platt.
Procedural Background:
Following the accident, Ray filed
suit against Swager and Scott Platt. Swager answered with a motion for summary
disposition based on governmental immunity, arguing that, as a government
employee, he was immune because he wasn’t “grossly negligent” and his conduct
wasn’t the “proximate cause” of Ray’s injuries.
When the MCOA reversed the decision
of the trial court and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of
Swager, it concluded that his remark ‘let’s go’ could not be considered the
proximate cause of Ray’s injuries since Ray ran in front of Platt’s car and
Platt hit him.
Supreme Court framework for analyzing ‘proximate cause’ under GTLA:
The analysis under this framework
begins by:
- Determining whether the defendant's gross negligence was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries,
- If his gross negligence is a factual cause, then consider whether the defendant was a proximate or legal cause by addressing foresee-ability, and
- Whether the actor may be held legally responsible for his or her conduct.
In addition to considering the
governmental actor’s conduct, it must also be decided whether there are other
proximate causes of the injury.
Determining if there are other proximate
causes of the injury requires consideration of whether any other human person
was negligent. The court stated: “only a human actor’s breach of a duty can be a proximate cause.” While
natural forces may bear on the question of foreseeability and intervening causes
when analyzing proximate cause, the
court indicated that they can never be considered the proximate cause of a
plaintiff’s injuries for the purposes of the GTLA.
Once all the proximate causes of
the injuries have been determined, then, taking all those causes into account,
the question is: was the government actor’s gross negligence the “proximate
cause” of the injury. In an effort to clarify this position the court stated: “The
relevant inquiry is not whether the defendant’s conduct was the immediate
factual cause of injury, but whether, weighing the legal responsibilities of
the actors involved, the government actor could be considered “the proximate
cause.”
Using the analysis recommended by
the Michigan Supreme Court, the MCOA wrote that “Because issues of material
fact remain that preclude summary disposition, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of Swager’s motion for summary disposition and remand for further
proceedings.”
Concurring Opinion:
Hon. Mark T. Boonstra, while
agreeing with the outcome of the majority, argued that the Supreme Court’s new method
of analysis is so confusing that “it may be that trial courts will throw up
their hands and simply allow everything to proceed to trial, even when
circumstances may not warrant.” Because of this, Judge Boonstra urged the
Legislature to state its intent, concluding that “…it is the Legislature that
can avoid further and prolonged judicial wrangling over legislative intent, and
further confusion in the trial courts, by restating its intent clearly and
explicitly and perhaps, as the [MSCt] Dissent suggests, without reference to
the much-maligned term, “proximate cause”.
Labels: cross-country, governmental tort liability act, gross negligence, michigan supreme court, personal injury appeal, the proximate cause