The Court of Appeals (COA) reversed the decision of the
probate court, confirmed by the circuit court, because of the incorrect
application of preclusion principles to the Petitioner’s Petition for a change
of Guardianship. The matter was returned
to the Probate Court for further proceedings.
This case (In re Guardianship of Alexander VictorBibi and Nadia Francis Wallace, also known as Nadia Bibi, Minors. No. 327159) began
in Canada. The Canadian case was started by the Windsor-Essex Children’s
Aid Society because of the neglect of the parents. The grandmothers, Bibi and
Wallace, agreed to a consent judgment, which placed the children with Wallace
for a period of 6 months. The following spring, the father died and the mother
was incarcerated.
The children and their grandmothers moved to Michigan. Bibi
petitioned the probate court, asking it to appoint her as the children’s full
guardian. The probate court denied her request finding that Bibi’s petition was
barred by the preclusion principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata. In
other words, the matter had been fully decided by the Canadian Court. Wallace
remained as guardian. Bibi appealed to the Circuit Court.
The Circuit Court upheld the probate court decision stating
that Bibi failed to establish proper cause or a change of circumstances
sufficient to reopen the guardianship decision of the Ontario Court.
The Court of Appeals
analysis.
1) The Court of Appeals (COA) first looked at
whether the Michigan or Canadian law governed the effect of the Canadian
consent judgment. While, generally, the interpretation of a contract is
governed by the state in which it is created, there is an exception when the ultimate
decision is not final. The COA concluded Michigan law applied since Canadian law
sees preclusion principles as flexible and discretionary, not final.
2) The Canadian court, in answer to a query by the
Probate Court, stated it had nothing pending in the matter and would terminate
its jurisdiction as soon as the probate court assumed jurisdiction.
3) Collateral Estoppel. Bibi argued that the
probate court was wrong when it applied collateral estopped to bar her
petition. The COA agreed. While collateral estoppel is a flexible rule designed
to bring finality to decisions, for it to bar further action, the decision must
be final and fully argued. The consent agreement in Canada was not a final decision
but merely an agreement between parties creating a temporary placement for the
children.
4) Res Judicata, as applied by the Probate Court, didn’t
apply because the consent agreement left open more decisions when it placed the
children with Wallace until further Order of the Court. And, the situation of
the children’s parents had changed drastically. The father had died and the
mother was incarcerated thus neither was available for their children.
5) The Circuit Court, when considering Bibi’s
appeal, used alternative grounds for upholding the Probate Court’s decision. It
decided that Bibi’s failure to establish proper cause or changed circumstances
under the Child Custody Act (CCA) was a valid reason for supporting the Probate
Court. The COA noted that the CCA applies to child custody actions and allows
guardians to bring custody actions as long as the probate judge acts as circuit
judge for those child custody actions. In this case, there was no circuit court
custody decision regarding the children and thus, the probate court order
couldn’t modify an order from the circuit court. The Circuit Court was in
error.
6) The COA denied Bibi’s request to assign the case
to a different judge on remand. While agreeing that some of the probate judge’s
remarks were inappropriate, the COA stated they didn’t rise to the level of
reassignment.
The COA reversed the decisions of both the Probate and the
Circuit Courts and sent the matter back to the Probate Court for a
consideration of the Petitions on the Merits.
Labels: Guardianship, Michigan, Michigan Appeals, michigan court of appeals, Preclusion, probate appeal, Wayne County
