COA Puts Brakes on Step-Parent Adoption; Reverses TPR

In the case In re Michael Robert Benbow III, Minor, the COA reversed an order of the Clinton County Family Court terminating a father’s parental rights in a step-parent adoption case. The Trial Court based its ruling on the fact that the father failed to substantially support the child for more than two years pursuant to MCL 710.51(6)(a). Specifically, the court found that the father failed to make payments during a large portion of time between July of 2005 and July 2007. However, the court neglected the fact that his obligation to pay support was abated due to incarceration for most of 2005. When the ordered obligation was reinstated the father began making his child support payments regularly, with the exception of a few months. The trial court failed to consider the “substantial compliance” portion of MCL 710.51(6)(a) in terms of compliance with the support order that was in place, as directed by the statute. Instead, the COA concluded that the trial court made its erroneous finding by incorrectly considering the time period in which the support was abated. Consequently, the Court reversed the termination order, thus putting a kibosh on the step-parent adoption.

Custody Hearing Allowed for Weekend Parent

In Powery v Wells, the COA affirmed a trial court’s order changing custody of a minor child based on the mother’s move from Ludington to Traverse City. The trial court ordered the change even though the move was less than 100 miles and the child had an established custodial environment with both parents. The COA reasoned that the father met his burden of illustrating a change in circumstance by showing that the move to Traverse City would disrupt the current parenting time arrangement. It further held that the modification of parenting time triggered by the mother’s move amounted to a change in the established custodial environment because it would turn one parent into a “weekend parent.” The COA concluded that the move was not in the child’s best interest based on the disruption in parenting time. Although the trial court failed to include a statement in its opinion that modifying the custody order to grant defendant weekly physical custody during the school year was in the child’s best interest, the Court inferred that conclusion from the trial court’s written opinion. The opinion resulted in the father obtaining custody during the school year if the mother chooses to stay in Traverse City. Interestingly, this decision ends in the same result that the trial court ostensibly wanted to avoid--turning the mother into the weekend parent. This begs the question: what is the relevance of the 100 mile rule if a change in circumstance can be found with any move that slightly alters the status quo?